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This dissertation contributes to the stream of literature that examines the role of
accounting information in capital markets. The first two chapters deal with the economic
consequences of changes in accounting regulations. The third chapter examines the
relation between accounting earnings and asset prices. Chapter 1 studies the impact of
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption on the cost of equity and
liquidity of European banks. The adoption of IFRS is associated with lower cost of equity
particularly for banks with low pre-adoption quality of information environment. Chapter
2 examines the effect of IFRS adoption on the risk exposure of banks in Europe. Our
analysis shows an increase in the risk exposure of banks after the mandatory adoption of
the new accounting standards. We provide limited evidence that the increase in risk
exposure is more pronounced for banks that operate in countries where accounting
numbers are more likely to be used for contracting purposes. Chapter 3 focuses on the
relation between aggregate earnings changes and corporate bond market returns.
Aggregate earnings changes are negatively related to investment-grade corporate bond
market returns and unrelated to high-yield corporate bond market returns. Further, the
earnings-returns relation is lower for high-rated and long-term corporate bonds. These
findings suggest that aggregate earnings contain information about cash flows and
discount rates. Overall, the essays in this thesis highlight the importance of changes in
accounting regulations and the significance of accounting information for equity and debt
investors.
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Chapter 1
Capital market effects of mandatory
IFRS adoption on banks∗
1.1 Introduction
Since 2005, listed companies in more than 100 countries mandatorily prepare their financial statements under In-
ternational Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). The economic consequences of the new accounting standards
have been the center of attention of both practitioners and academics in recent years. Most of the empirical re-
search focuses on the effects of the adoption of IFRS at an economy-wide level (e.g., Daske [2006]; Daske et al.
[2008]; Hail and Leuz [2007]; Li [2010]). However, there is little evidence on the impact of IFRS on firms in the
banking sector (e.g., Armstrong et al. [2010]; Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas [2010]). We add to this stream of
literature by examining the impact of IFRS adoption on the cost of equity and liquidity of banks.
The banking sector is of particular interest for three reasons. First, as a result of the adoption of IFRS, banks have
significantly increased the reporting of assets and liabilities at fair value (e.g., PricewaterhouseCoopers [2006]).
Yet, the merits of the transition from historical cost to fair value accounting are far from obvious. Advocates of
fair value argue that it increases the value relevance of accounting numbers (e.g., Barth et al. [1996]). But other
∗This chapter is based on Gkougkousi and Mertens [2011]. We thank Christina Dargenidou, Abe de Jong,
Doug DeJong, Renhui Fu, Ann Gaeremynck, Martin Hoogendoorn, Carel Huijgen, Jim Hunton, Olga Khalina,
Lars Norden, Erik Peek, Peter Roosenboom, Rui Shen, Mathijs van Dijk, Manuel Vasconcelos, the session
participants at the European Accounting Association 33rd Annual Congress, and in particular Pauline Weetman,
Christian Leuz, and Holger Daske, the session participants at the 5th Workshop on Accounting and Regulation,
the session participants at the Benelux Corporate Finance Day 2010, the session participants at the American
Accounting Association 2010 Northeast Region Meeting, the session participants at the University of Technology
Sydney Summer Accounting Consortium, the workshop participants at Rotterdam School of Management, and
the workshop participants at University of Amsterdam for helpful comments.
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researchers, such as Bleck and Gao [2011], claim that fair value increases the riskiness of banks. Second, the
changes in financial reporting caused by the adoption of IFRS—such as the classification of financial instruments
and the restriction of items that firms are allowed to keep off balance sheet—are more pronounced for financial
compared to nonfinancial firms. Third, banks have been the strongest opponents to the adoption of IFRS. A
prime example of this opposition is the letter that the French president Jacques Chirac wrote to the European
Commission in 2003 to express his concerns and the concerns of the French banks’ managers about the potential
adverse effects of IFRS adoption.
The main changes in banks’ financial reporting caused by the adoption of IFRS are: increased disclosure require-
ments, increased comparability of financial statements, and increased use of fair value accounting. Regarding
disclosure requirements, International Accounting Standards (IAS) 32 mandates that banks provide extensive in-
formation on their risk management policies and objectives as well as information on their exposure to a number
of risks such as credit and liquidity risk.1 The adoption of IFRS has also increased the comparability of banks’
financial statements. For example, the adoption of IAS 39 has standardized the classification and measurement
of financial assets and hedging instruments of adopting banks across different countries. In addition, banks have
significantly increased the reporting of assets and liabilities at fair value after the adoption of IFRS. For example,
the ratio of investment securities measured at fair value to total investment securities for the banks in our sample
increased from 46% in 2004 under domestic accounting standards to 92% in 2005 under IFRS. The same pattern
is observed in the case of financial liabilities.
There are two main reasons driving this increase in the use of fair value accounting. The first is the restrictive
nature of the held-to-maturity category of financial assets. More specifically, if a bank sells or reclassifies be-
fore maturity a significant amount of financial assets that is originally classified as held-to-maturity, then this
bank cannot classify any financial assets as held-to-maturity for the following two years (IAS 39.46.b). To
avoid potential penalties that arise from reclassifications, banks classify a larger portion of investment securi-
ties as available-for-sale and measure them at fair value, instead of classifying them as held-to-maturity and
measuring them at historical cost (PricewaterhouseCoopers [2006]). Second, banks measure a larger portion of
financial assets at fair value to mitigate the accounting mismatches that stem from recognition and measurement
inconsistencies (PricewaterhouseCoopers [2006]). Accounting mismatches arise when banks measure assets and
liabilities on different basis.
1IAS is a set of standards that comprise IFRS. IAS was issued before 2001 and was significantly revised as
part of the mandatory adoption of IFRS in 2005. Whenever we refer to IAS, we mean the revised versions of the
standards.
Capital market effects of mandatory IFRS adoption on banks 3
Academic studies suggest that increased disclosure requirements and increased comparability of financial state-
ments increase a firm’s liquidity and decrease its cost of equity (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia [1991]; Barth
et al. [1999]). However, other studies argue that fair value accounting increases banks’ earnings volatility, makes
banks more procyclical, and accentuates their risk-taking behavior, which can result in increased cost of equity
(e.g., Plantin et al. [2008]). Hence, the impact of IFRS adoption on the cost of equity and liquidity of banks is an
empirical question. We shed light in this area by first examining the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on the
cost of equity and liquidity of European banks. Then, we test the theoretical predictions that fair value account-
ing can have adverse effects on banks’ cost of equity. Further, we examine whether there is any cross-sectional
variation in the capital market effects of IFRS adoption.
We focus on European banks for two reasons. First, European countries adopted the same amended version of
IAS 39 in 2005.2 Since the adoption of IAS 39 had a considerable impact on banks’ financial statements (Ernst
& Young [2006]), we focus on European banks to ensure homogeneity of the adopted standards. Second, the
enforcement of rules and regulations in Europe is relatively high. We expect that this stricter legal and regulatory
environment will result in proper enforcement of the new accounting standards and will increase the robustness
of our results (e.g., Bhattacharya and Daouk [2002]). In addition, we limit our analysis to mandatory IFRS
adopters, to circumvent possible endogeneity issues related to the voluntary adoption of IFRS.
We measure the cost of equity averaging over the estimates of four different implied cost-of-equity models (Hail
and Leuz [2006]). As our proxy for liquidity we use the Amihud [2002] illiquidity measure and as robustness test
we use bid-ask spread and zero returns. To examine the impact of mandatory IFRS adoption on the cost of equity
of European banks, we use a panel of 1,997 bank-year observations of banks from 37 countries for the period
2002–2007; 422 bank-year observations from 18 European countries (treatment sample) and 1,575 bank-year
observations from 19 non-European countries (control sample). For liquidity, we use a panel of 4,562 bank-
year observations of banks from 49 countries for the period 2002–2007; 1,142 bank-year observations from 20
European countries (treatment sample) and 3,420 bank-year observations from 29 other non-European countries
(control sample).
Our multivariate analysis shows a statistically and economically significant decrease in cost of equity by ninety
basis points for European banks that mandatorily report under IFRS. Regarding liquidity, the results of our anal-
ysis are sensitive to the proxy used. Contrary to the predictions of recent theoretical studies, we find no evidence
2The following two carve-outs were imposed to the adoption of IAS 39 by European banks: the removal of
the fair value option for liabilities that are not required to be measured at fair value and the permission of fair
value hedge accounting for the interest-rate hedges of core deposits.
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of lower capital market benefits for banks with higher exposure to fair value accounting. Quite the opposite, the
decrease in cost of equity is only present in the subsample of banks with a large increase in the exposure to fair
value accounting after the adoption of IFRS. These results are consistent with fair value accounting providing
value relevant information to investors. In addition, banks with low pre-adoption information quality experience
significantly larger improvements in their cost of equity compared to banks with high pre-adoption information
quality.
Our study adds to the literature in a number of ways. First, we examine the effect of IFRS adoption on banks.
Doing so is particularly interesting due to the controversial impact of fair value accounting on the cost of equity of
banks. Our findings do not support the idea that fair value accounting is suboptimal for this particular industrial
sector. On the contrary, our findings provide support to the theory that fair value accounting can increase the value
relevance of accounting numbers and can enhance transparency. Second, we show that the adoption of IFRS has
mostly benefitted the banks operating in countries with low pre-adoption quality of information environment.
These findings are in line with the idea that the new accounting standards contribute to the homogenization of
information quality across different countries and they level the playing field for investors. Third, in the case
of accounting standards ”one size does not fit all”. The majority of prior research examines the impact of IFRS
adoption on the economy as a whole. Banks are highly regulated institutions that serve a unique economic role.
Hence, the impact of IFRS on banks can differ significantly from the impact of IFRS on other industrial sectors.
We believe that our industry focus will reduce the noise in the estimates and will produce more robust results.
Fourth, our study provides a novel attempt to test the theoretical predictions of the papers on the economic role
of fair value accounting and to disentangle the effects of increased use of fair value accounting from increased
disclosure requirements and increased comparability of financial statements.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In section 1.2, we discuss relevant academic papers. In section 1.3, we describe
our research design. In section 1.4, we describe the sample and present descriptive statistics. In sections 1.5 and
1.6, we report the results of the main and additional analysis, respectively. In section 1.7, we report the results of
the robustness tests and section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 Related Literature
Theoretical studies suggest that corporate disclosure can affect the cost of equity in both an indirect and a direct
way. According to the first stream of literature, the effect of disclosure on cost of equity flows through liquidity.
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More specifically, corporate disclosure reduces information asymmetry between a firm and its investors and miti-
gates adverse selection problems. This reduction in information asymmetry increases liquidity, which ultimately
results in lower cost of equity (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia [1991]). The second stream of literature suggests a
direct relation between corporate disclosure and cost of equity. For example, Merton [1987] shows that corporate
disclosure introduces less known firms to investors and increases the diversification benefits, hence lowering the
cost of equity.
Higher comparability of financial statements can also lead to capital market improvements. On the one hand,
higher comparability lowers the information acquisition costs that investors have to bear (Barth et al. [1999]).
On the other hand, it induces positive externalities; investors can use information acquired from the financial
statements of a firm in one country to compare and value firms in other countries (Dye [1990]).
Academic research identifies increased disclosure requirements and increased comparability of financial state-
ments as the main changes caused by the adoption of IFRS (e.g., Li [2010]) and pays less attention to the role
of increased use of fair value accounting. A number of recent analytical papers provide interesting predictions
regarding the effect of the transition from historical cost to fair value accounting, particularly for banks. Plantin
et al. [2008] and Allen and Carletti [2008] compare historical cost with fair value accounting in the presence of an
exogenous liquidity shock. Plantin et al. [2008] show that when liquidity dries up, asset prices are smoother un-
der historical cost than under mark-to-market accounting. The excessive volatility under mark-to-market makes
prices less informative and increases the risk, which investors have to bear. Allen and Carletti [2008] suggest
that the transition of a liquidity shock from the insurance to the banking sector is more likely under fair value
than under historical cost accounting. This higher probability of contagion leads to excessive liquidations and
increases the firm’s risk.
Freixas and Tsomocos [2006] show that historical cost is more efficient than fair value accounting, because under
fair value reported earnings and consequently dividend distribution is more volatile. Glavan and Trombetta
[2009] reach to similar conclusions by showing that consumption smoothing is ex-ante more efficient under
historical cost accounting because historical cost accounting provides protection to banks in bad times.
Theory also suggests that fair value accounting increases the risk-taking behavior of banks. Burkhardt and Strausz
[2006] argue that fair value accounting reduces the information asymmetry between banks and the market. This
decrease in information asymmetry increases asset liquidity and amplifies banks’ investment opportunities. Con-
sequently, banks increase their risk-taking activities, which ultimately raises the probability of default. Bleck
and Gao [2011] also investigate the real effects of mark-to-market on banks’ activities. They show that mark-to-
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market increases the retention of loans that the banks originate and at the same time it reduces banks’ incentives
to originate loans of good quality.
Fewer theoretical papers suggest that fair value is preferable over historical cost accounting. For example, Bleck
and Liu [2007] show that fair value provides investors with an early warning signal, thus reducing the occurrence
of asset price crashes. Overall, the majority of the theoretical papers on the effects of increased use of fair value
accounting for banks suggest an increase in the risk that investors have to bear. Under the assumption that this
risk is systematic, we expect that it will ultimately translate to higher cost of equity.3
If we take into account the increased disclosure requirements and increased comparability of financial statements
as a result of the adoption of IFRS, we expect a decrease in the cost of equity and an increase in liquidity of
adopting firms. The opposite prediction can be derived from the majority of the theoretical papers that model the
transition from historical cost to fair value accounting for banks. These opposite effects make an empirical study
into the capital market consequences of mandatory IFRS adoption on banks a relevant topic for research.
1.3 Research Design
To examine the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on the cost of equity of banks, we regress the cost-of-equity
proxy (ravg) on a dummy variable (IFRSravg) that takes the value of one if the company mandatorily reports
under IFRS, and zero otherwise. We also regress this proxy on a set of control variables. To study the impact
of IFRS on liquidity, we regress the liquidity proxy (liquidityAmihud) in the same way. Hence, we run pooled
regressions at bank-year level on the cost-of-equity model 1.1:
ravg = γ0 + γ1 × IFRSravg +
K∑
k=2
γk × Controlk + Y ear/CountryDummies+ υ (1.1)
And we run pooled regressions at bank-year level on the liquidity model 1.2:
liquidityAmihud = δ0 + δ1 × IFRSliquidity +
N∑
n=2
δn × Controln + Y ear/CountryDummies+ η (1.2)
To produce unbiased coefficient estimates, we must control for time-series variability in the dependents that is
3It is well established that increased procyclicality and increased risk-taking increases firms’ systematic risk.
What is less clear is the relation between earnings volatility and systematic risk.
Capital market effects of mandatory IFRS adoption on banks 7
unrelated to the adoption of IFRS. To this end, we use a control sample of banks that do not report under IFRS.
The choice of a control sample is far from obvious since all European listed firms are required to report under
IFRS in the post-2005 period. Voluntary IFRS adopters could be a valid control sample. However, there are
only few observations of voluntary adopters, which reduces significantly the power of our tests. So, we use all
observations of non-European banks that do not report under IFRS as a control sample. In addition, we include
year dummies.
We use four different implied cost-of-equity estimates suggested by Claus and Thomas [2001], Gebhardt et al.
[2001], Gode and Mohanram [2003], and Easton [2004] to measure expected returns. We use implied cost-
of-equity estimates instead of realized returns because realized returns have been shown to be a poor proxy
for expected returns (e.g., Elton [1999]). Appendix A describes the calculation of the implied cost-of-equity
estimates in detail. Following Hail and Leuz [2006], we average over the four estimates. To ensure that previous
year’s financial statements are publicly available and to reduce the error in forecasted earnings, we take earnings
forecasts as of October of each year. To make prices synchronous to financial statement data, we discount the
prices as of October to the beginning of the year using the cost-of-equity estimate, that is we use (1 + ravg)−
10
12
as a discount factor.
To calculate the cost of equity, we require positive mean forecasted earnings per share for years 1 and 2. To
calculate the medium-term growth in earnings we need either the long-term growth estimate provided by IBES
or the mean forecasted earnings per share for year 3. We also require that medium-term growth in earnings be
positive and that price data be available on IBES. As a perpetual growth estimate, we use the country-specific
risk-free rate minus 3% (Gode and Mohanram [2003]). We replace negative values of the perpetual growth
rate with the average historical country-specific risk-free rate minus 3%. For the dividend payout we use the
three-year average dividend payout provided by Worldscope and assume that firms will retain it in the future.
Whenever dividend payout data are unavailable, we use the average country-specific value.
As liquidity proxy, we use the illiquidity measure suggested by Amihud [2002]. So, we measure liquidity as
the yearly median of the daily ratio of absolute stock returns to trading volume measured in U.S. dollars. We
measure trading volume in U.S. dollars to ensure the comparability of the illiquidity measure across countries
with different currencies. To facilitate reporting, we multiply the liquidity proxy by 106. The main advantage of
the Amihud [2002] illiquidity measure is that it can be easily obtained from daily stock market data. Moreover, as
Goyenko et al. [2009] show, Amihud’s illiquidity proxy does a good job in measuring price impact. As robustness
test, we use bid-ask spread and zero returns as proxies for liquidity.
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The set of control variables for the cost-of-equity model includes: Beta, which we calculate as the covariance
of firms’ returns to a country-specific broad market index divided by the variance of that index using monthly
observations over the last five years; Total Assets, which we measure as the book value of total assets in U.S.
dollars at year end; Book to Market, calculated as the book-to-market value of shareholders’ equity at year end;
and Financial Leverage, calculated as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets at year end. We also include
Beta Volatility, which we calculate as the standard deviation of daily betas over the past five years (Hughes
et al. [2009]). Daily betas are calculated using daily observations over the past year. In addition, we control for
Forecast Bias, which we calculate as the one-year-ahead IBES analyst forecast error scaled by book value per
share. Although analysts’ forecast error is not a priced risk factor, failing to control for it might lead to false
inferences. For example, an increase in analysts’ optimism as a result of the adoption of IFRS will increase the
cost-of-equity estimates and will bias the coefficient of the IFRSravg dummy upwards. Further, to control for
the fact that analyst forecasts are expressed in nominal terms, we include Expected Inflation, which we calculate
as the median annualized one-year-ahead change in the country-specific Consumer Price Index (CPI) (Hail and
Leuz [2006]).
The set of control variables in the liquidity model comprises Return Volatility, which we calculate as the standard
deviation of monthly returns over the last year; Market Value of Equity, which we measure as the market value
of shareholders’ equity in U.S. dollars at year end; and Share Turnover, which we calculate as the annual trading
volume divided by the market value of equity. All variables are truncated at the 1 and 99% level.
As additional analysis, we examine whether there is any cross-sectional variation in the effect of IFRS adoption
on banks’ cost of equity. In particular, we test whether the impact of IFRS depends on the banks’ exposure to
fair value accounting, on the difference between domestic accounting standards and IFRS, on the pre-adoption
quality of the information environment of banks, and on the pre-adoption information asymmetry between banks
and investors and between investors. To that end, we split the cost-of-equity sample in banks with above-median
and banks with below-median values of the variables of interest (e.g., pre-adoption information asymmetry), we
run subsample regressions on model 1.1, and we compare the resulting coefficients of the IFRSravg dummy.
As a proxy for the increase in the exposure of banks to fair value accounting (∆FV), we use the ratio of financial
assets measured at fair value to total assets in the restated 2004 financial statements prepared under IFRS minus
the ratio of financial assets measured at fair value to total assets in the 2004 financial statements prepared under
domestic accounting standards.4 To construct the variable ∆FV we collect data from the banks’ annual reports.
4Banks that adopt IFRS in 2005 must restate the 2004 financial statements from domestic accounting stan-
dards to IFRS in the 2005 annual reports. So, the 2004 financial statements for every bank are reported under
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We use the Absence and Divergence measures suggested by Ding et al. [2007] as proxies for the difference
between domestic accounting standards and IFRS. Absence is a proxy for the extent to which accounting rules
regarding specific topics are covered in IAS but are not covered in domestic accounting standards. Divergence
is a proxy for the extent to which accounting rules regarding certain topics differ between IAS and domestic
accounting standards.
We measure information quality (InfoQuality) as the first principal component derived from the variables ADR,
Standards, Exchanges, and Market Value of Equity (Armstrong et al. [2010]). ADR is a dummy that takes the
value of one if the bank participates in an American Depository Receipt program, and zero otherwise. Standards
is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the bank reports under U.S. standards or IAS before 2005, and
zero otherwise. Exchanges measures the number of exchanges on which a bank is listed and Market Value of
Equity is the market value of shareholders’ equity in U.S. dollars at year end.
We use as a proxy for information asymmetry (InfoAsymmetry) the first principal component derived from the
variables Turnover, CloselyHeld, and BankConcentration (Armstrong et al. [2010]). Turnover is the annual
average of the daily ratio of trading volume to shares outstanding. CloselyHeld measures the percentage of
shares held by insiders. BankConcentration is the country-specific ratio of the total assets of the three largest
banks to the assets of all commercial banks (Beck et al. [2010]). To construct the variables InfoQuality and
InfoAsymmetry for the period 2005–2007, we use the values of the variables ADR, Standards, Exchanges, Market
Value of Equity, Turnover, CloselyHeld, and BankConcentration as of the end of 2004, because we are interested
in the pre-adoption information quality and pre-adoption information asymmetry of banks.
Since we are dealing with panel data, we are concerned that our models might suffer from time-invariant omitted
variables bias, which will result in inconsistent Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates. For the cost-of-equity
model, we have few annual observations per bank, so the Fixed Effects (FE) estimation technique is not ap-
propriate. Hence, we use OLS for the estimation of the parameters of the cost-of-equity model and FE for the
estimation of the parameters of the liquidity model. We also test the appropriateness of the Random Effects (RE)
estimation technique for the liquidity model. However, the Hausman [1978] specification test rejects the null
that the RE produces consistent estimates. We use standard errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity and are
clustered by bank.
domestic accounting standards in the 2004 annual reports and under IFRS in the 2005 annual reports.
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1.4 Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics
1.4.1 Sample Selection
Our treatment sample consists of banks (SIC codes 6000–6199) domiciled in countries that belong either to the
European Union (E.U.) or to the European Economic Area (E.E.A.). The control sample consists of banks (SIC
codes 6000–6199) that report under domestic accounting standards and are domiciled in any country other than
the countries of the E.U. and the E.E.A.. Our sample comprises the same number of years before and after the
mandatory adoption of IFRS in 2005. Hence, the cost-of-equity sample consists of annual data from 2002–2007
for banks whose earnings forecast data are available on IBES. The liquidity sample consists of annual data from
2002–2007 for banks whose market data are available on Datastream. We obtain earnings forecast data from
IBES. We get financial statement data from Worldscope and from the banks’ annual reports, which we download
from Thomson Research. We obtain market data from Datastream.
1.4.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1.1, panel A presents the composition of the cost-of-equity sample by country. Panel B shows the com-
position of the liquidity sample. The cost-of-equity treatment sample consists of 422 bank-year observations
representing 128 distinct banks from 18 European countries. The control sample consists of 1,575 bank-year
observations representing 477 distinct banks from 19 countries. Almost half of the observations of the treatment
sample concern French, Italian, and British banks. The European liquidity sample consists of 1,142 bank-year
observations representing 283 distinct banks from 20 European countries. The liquidity control sample consists
of 3,420 bank-year observations representing 785 distinct banks from 29 countries. Half of the bank-year obser-
vations of the treatment sample belong to French, Italian, and British banks. The cost-of-equity sample is less
than half of the liquidity sample because the coverage in IBES is limited compared to the coverage in Datastream.
Table 1.1
Sample Composition
Panel A: Composition of cost-of-equity sample by country
Treatment sample Control sample
Country Bank-year Bank Country Bank-year Bank
Austria 1 1 Argentina 2 1
Belgium 8 2 Australia 15 4
(Continued)
Capital market effects of mandatory IFRS adoption on banks 11
Table 1.1 – Continued
Treatment sample Control sample
Country Bank-year Bank Country Bank-year Bank
Czech Republic 5 1 Canada 41 7
Denmark 28 10 Egypt 2 1
Finland 6 2 Hong Kong 15 5
France 35 10 India 34 14
Germany 10 4 Indonesia 26 10
Greece 34 8 Israel 6 2
Hungary 2 1 Japan 22 9
Ireland 13 3 Malaysia 17 5
Italy 76 27 Philippines 16 5
Norway 19 7 Singapore 8 2
Poland 28 8 South Africa 14 4
Portugal 20 4 South Korea 20 6
Spain 17 4 Switzerland 24 8
Sweden 13 4 Taiwan 12 6
The Netherlands 15 6 Thailand 19 7
U.K. 92 26 Turkey 2 2
Total 422 128 U.S.A. 1,280 379
Total 1,575 477
Panel B: Composition of liquidity sample by country
Treatment sample Control sample
Country Bank-year Bank Country Bank-year Bank
Austria 7 4 Argentina 27 7
Belgium 24 6 Australia 1 1
Czech Republic 6 1 Brazil 56 12
Denmark 66 14 Canada 134 34
Finland 7 2 Chile 37 7
France 171 42 Colombia 18 4
Germany 47 16 Egypt 28 9
Greece 85 17 Hong Kong 62 12
Hungary 2 1 India 159 41
Ireland 49 9 Indonesia 41 12
Italy 229 53 Israel 49 10
Lithuania 2 1 Japan 464 92
Luxembourg 4 1 Jordan 3 2
Norway 35 10 Malaysia 81 16
Poland 56 12 Mexico 13 3
Portugal 25 5 Morocco 13 5
Spain 61 14 New Zealand 3 1
Sweden 20 10 Pakistan 44 16
The Netherlands 79 17 Peru 2 1
U.K. 167 48 Qatar 4 2
Total 1,142 283 Singapore 22 5
South Korea 84 22
Sri Lanka 20 7
Switzerland 66 17
Taiwan 131 29
Thailand 100 20
Turkey 31 9
(Continued)
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Table 1.1 – Continued
Treatment sample Control sample
Country Bank-year Bank Country Bank-year Bank
U.S.A. 1,722 387
Venezuela 5 2
Total 3,420 785
Panel A and panel B of this table present the composition of the cost-of-equity and liquidity sample by country, respectively.
Table 1.2, panel A presents descriptive statistics for the dependent variables of models 1.1 and 1.2 and for the
four separate implied cost-of-equity estimates that comprise the cost-of-equity proxy. The average cost-of-equity
estimate is 10.86% and the median is 9.98%. Despite the fact that we truncate the liquidity proxy at the 1% level,
its mean value is very different from its median (i.e., 83.61 versus 16.62). This difference is similar to previous
studies (Hail and Leuz [2007]). Since the distribution of the liquidity proxy departs greatly from normality, we
use its logarithmic transformation in subsequent analyses.
Table 1.2, panel B presents descriptive statistics for the models 1.1 and 1.2 independent variables. Many inde-
pendent variables are skewed, so we use their logarithmic transformation in the regression analysis. In particular,
we use the logarithmic transformation of all the ratio independent variables that are strictly positive (i.e., all
variables except for Beta, Forecast Bias, and Expected Inflation). For the cost-of-equity sample, only 10% of the
bank-year observations are banks that report under IFRS. For the liquidity sample, only 12% of the bank-year
observations regard banks that report under IFRS. Both the cost-of-equity and the liquidity samples are weighted
towards larger firms.5 As a result, we expect that the capital market proxies will be measured with greater pre-
cision. For example, analysts’ forecast error is smaller for larger firms (Bhushan [1989]), so the cost-of-equity
proxy will be more accurate. This sample bias also works against us, if we assume that the largest changes in the
information environment as a result of IFRS are mainly present in smaller banks.
Table 1.3, panel A presents correlation coefficients for the cost-of-equity sample with Spearman (Pearson) cor-
relation coefficients reported below (above) the diagonal. Table 1.3, panel B presents the correlation coefficients
for the liquidity sample. The absolute values of all correlation coefficients between the independent variables are
below 0.6. These low correlations suggest that multicollinearity is not an issue for our models.
5The mean of Total Assets (Market Value of Equity) for our cost-of-equity (liquidity) sample is 55,462 (6,277)
but the mean of Total Assets (Market Value of Equity) for the banks that comprise the Worldscope universe is
37,589 (4,491).
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Table 1.2
Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for dependent variables of models 1.1 and 1.2
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis N
ravg 10.86% 9.98% 0.03 1.51 5.67 1,997
rct 10.62% 9.20% 0.05 3.39 16.58 1,997
re 11.80% 10.83% 0.04 1.69 8.20 1,997
rgm 11.80% 10.93% 0.04 1.71 7.74 1,997
rgls 9.22% 8.68% 0.03 1.17 5.59 1,997
liquidityAmihud 83.61 16.62 190.89 5.39 44.89 4,562
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for independent variables of models 1.1 and 1.2
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis N
IFRSravg 0.10 0.00 0.30 2.62 7.86 1,997
Beta 0.64 0.57 0.42 0.59 2.82 1,997
Total Assets 55,462.48 6,572.16 145,336.80 4.45 25.16 1,997
Book to Market 0.60 0.55 0.27 1.64 7.28 1,997
Financial Leverage 0.86 0.91 0.15 −2.67 10.03 1,997
Beta Volatility 0.24 0.20 0.13 1.13 3.93 1,997
Forecast Bias 0.81 0.00 4.15 5.59 35.17 1,997
Expected Inflation 3.04% 2.96% 0.01 1.18 6.59 1,997
IFRSliquidity 0.12 0.00 0.32 2.41 6.80 4,562
Return Volatility 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.91 4.21 4,562
Market Value of Equity 6,276.99 821.00 15,328.64 4.05 21.96 4,562
Share Turnover 0.96 0.48 1.85 6.73 62.37 4,562
Panel A and panel B of this table present descriptive statistics for the model 1.1 and model 1.2 dependent and independent variables,
respectively. All variables are as defined in Appendix B.
14 Chapter 1
Ta
bl
e
1.
3
Sp
ea
rm
an
an
d
Pe
ar
so
n
Pa
ir
w
is
e
C
or
re
la
tio
n
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
ts
Pa
ne
lA
:S
pe
ar
m
an
an
d
Pe
ar
so
n
pa
ir
w
is
e
co
rr
el
at
io
n
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
sb
et
w
ee
n
va
ri
ab
le
so
fm
od
el
1.
1
To
ta
l
B
oo
k
to
Fi
na
nc
ia
l
B
et
a
Fo
re
ca
st
E
xp
ec
te
d
r a
v
g
IF
R
S r
a
v
g
B
et
a
A
ss
et
s
M
ar
ke
t
Le
ve
ra
ge
Vo
la
til
ity
B
ia
s
In
fla
tio
n
r a
v
g
−0
.0
05
0.
29
1*
**
0.
03
2
0.
32
6*
**
−0
.1
04
**
*
−0
.0
13
0.
11
9*
**
0.
17
9*
**
IF
R
S r
a
v
g
0.
04
7*
*
0.
20
2*
**
0.
20
7*
**
−0
.1
04
**
*
0.
11
8*
**
−0
.1
24
**
*
0.
22
2*
**
−0
.0
04
B
et
a
0.
30
4*
**
0.
19
6*
**
0.
32
7*
**
0.
05
5*
*
−0
.0
84
**
*
0.
07
9*
**
0.
16
0*
**
0.
08
9*
**
To
ta
lA
ss
et
s
0.
13
8*
**
0.
26
5*
**
0.
41
2*
**
0.
01
8
0.
20
1*
**
−0
.0
26
0.
18
6*
**
−0
.1
32
**
*
B
oo
k
to
M
ar
ke
t
0.
28
8*
**
−0
.0
97
**
*
0.
04
5*
*
0.
06
5*
**
0.
01
4
−0
.0
91
**
*
−0
.0
91
**
*
−0
.0
77
**
*
Fi
na
nc
ia
lL
ev
er
ag
e
0.
01
6
0.
20
9*
**
0.
04
9*
*
0.
52
1*
**
0.
01
9
−0
.1
73
**
*
0.
03
4
−0
.0
83
**
*
B
et
a
Vo
la
til
ity
−0
.0
05
−0
.1
18
**
*
0.
10
0*
**
−0
.1
48
**
*
−0
.0
96
**
*
−0
.0
90
**
*
−0
.0
56
**
0.
09
7*
**
Fo
re
ca
st
B
ia
s
0.
15
8*
**
0.
10
0*
**
0.
12
7*
**
0.
13
4*
**
−0
.0
60
**
*
0.
11
1*
**
−0
.0
46
**
0.
03
1
E
xp
ec
te
d
In
fla
tio
n
0.
01
7
−0
.0
19
0.
01
2
−0
.1
54
**
*
−0
.1
20
**
*
−0
.1
70
**
*
0.
12
5*
**
−0
.0
37
Pa
ne
lB
:S
pe
ar
m
an
an
d
Pe
ar
so
n
pa
ir
w
is
e
co
rr
el
at
io
n
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
sb
et
w
ee
n
va
ri
ab
le
so
fm
od
el
1.
2
liq
ui
di
ty
A
m
ih
u
d
IF
R
S l
iq
u
id
it
y
R
et
ur
n
Vo
la
til
ity
M
ar
ke
tV
al
ue
of
E
qu
ity
Sh
ar
e
Tu
rn
ov
er
liq
ui
di
ty
A
m
ih
u
d
−0
.0
93
**
*
0.
16
4*
**
−0
.1
26
**
*
−0
.1
16
**
*
IF
R
S l
iq
u
id
it
y
−0
.1
58
**
*
−0
.1
80
**
*
0.
29
9*
**
−0
.0
08
R
et
ur
n
Vo
la
til
ity
0.
16
7*
**
−0
.2
08
**
*
−0
.1
42
**
*
0.
22
1*
**
M
ar
ke
tV
al
ue
of
E
qu
ity
−0
.7
36
**
*
0.
24
9*
**
−0
.2
10
**
*
−0
.0
60
**
*
Sh
ar
e
Tu
rn
ov
er
−0
.4
68
**
*
−0
.0
55
**
*
0.
17
6*
**
−0
.0
31
**
Pa
ne
l
A
an
d
pa
ne
l
B
of
th
is
ta
bl
e
pr
es
en
t
Sp
ea
rm
an
(P
ea
rs
on
)
co
rr
el
at
io
n
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
s
be
lo
w
(a
bo
ve
)
th
e
di
ag
on
al
be
tw
ee
n
th
e
va
ri
ab
le
s
of
m
od
el
1.
1
an
d
be
tw
ee
n
th
e
va
ri
ab
le
s
of
m
od
el
1.
2,
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
A
ll
va
ri
ab
le
s
ar
e
as
de
fin
ed
in
A
pp
en
di
x
B
.*
,*
*,
an
d
**
*
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
at
th
e
10
%
,5
%
,a
nd
1%
le
ve
l,
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y,
al
lt
w
o-
ta
ile
d.
Capital market effects of mandatory IFRS adoption on banks 15
1.5 Main Analysis
Table 1.4 presents the results of our univariate analysis of the dependent variables of models 1.1 and 1.2. We
split the cost-of-equity and the liquidity samples in European firms and firms from other countries. We also split
the samples in pre- and post-IFRS adoption periods. We report mean values, median values, and the number of
observations for each subsample.
Table 1.4, panel A presents the results of the univariate analysis for the cost of equity. For European banks that
report under IFRS, the mean (median) cost of equity is lower by 1.19% (1.41%) than that of European banks
reporting under domestic accounting standards. This difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. For
the control sample, the difference in the mean values between the pre- and post-IFRS period is not statistically
different from zero and the difference in the medians is significant at the 5% level. The mean cost of equity of
European firms is higher than that of the control sample only for the pre-IFRS adoption period. So, we observe a
large and statistically significant decrease in the cost of equity of banks in the treatment sample after the adoption
of IFRS and a smaller decrease in the cost of equity of banks in the control sample.
Table 1.4, panel B presents the results of our univariate analysis for liquidity. For European banks that report
under IFRS, the mean (median) liquidity is higher by 47% (45%) than that of European banks reporting under
domestic accounting standards and this difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. We observe the
same pattern in the control sample; there is a significant increase in the liquidity of banks comprising the control
sample in the post-IFRS period. Hence, we observe a significant increase in the liquidity of banks of both the
treatment and the control sample in the post-IFRS period.
Next, we discuss the findings of our multivariate analysis. Table 1.5 presents the results of the multivariate
analysis for the cost-of-equity model. We report the OLS coefficients and the robust standard errors clustered
by bank in parentheses. The coefficient on the test variable IFRSravg is equal to −0.009 and is statistically
significant at the 1% level. Hence, after controlling for other relevant factors, the adoption of IFRS is associated
with a 90-basis-points decrease in European banks’ cost of equity. Contrary to our prediction, the coefficient
of the variable Ln(Financial Leverage) is negative and significant at the 1% level. This result is consistent both
with leverage being endogenously determined and with leverage being negatively associated with agency costs
(Berger and di Patti [2006]).
Table 1.6 presents the results of the multivariate analysis for the liquidity model. We report the regression
parameters estimated using FE and the robust standard errors clustered by bank in parentheses. The country
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Table 1.4
Univariate Analysis
Panel A: Univariate analysis for cost of equity
Pre-IFRS Post-IFRS Post-IFRS − Pre-IFRS
Treatment sample Mean 12.00% 10.81% −1.19%***
Median 11.81% 10.40% −1.41%***
N 217 205
Control sample Mean 10.79% 10.62% −0.17%
Median 9.90% 9.54% −0.36%**
N 777 798
Treatment sample Mean 1.21%*** 0.19%
− Control sample Median 1.91%*** 0.86%***
Panel B: Univariate analysis for liquidity
Pre-IFRS Post-IFRS Post-IFRS − Pre-IFRS
Treatment sample Mean 64.3 34.26 −30.04***
Median 13.3 7.32 −5.98***
N 616 526
Control sample Mean 113.2 80.01 −33.19***
Median 29.43 13.92 −15.51***
N 1,512 1,908
Treatment sample Mean −48.90*** −45.75***
− Control sample Median −16.13*** −6.60***
Panel A and panel B of this table present the results of the univariate analysis for the dependent variables of model 1.1 and model 1.2,
respectively. We split the cost-of-equity and liquidity samples by sample period, that is in pre-IFRS and post-IFRS period, and by sample
type, that is in treatment sample and control sample. We use t-test to compare the means and Wilcoxon rank-sum test to compare the medians
across subsamples. *, **, and *** significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively, all two-tailed.
dummies drop from the liquidity model when we use the FE estimation technique because they are time-invariant.
The coefficient on the test variable IFRSliquidity is equal to 0.032 and is not statistically different from zero.
Hence, the adoption of IFRS is not associated with a change in the liquidity of banks. The coefficients of the rest
of the independent variables have the predicted sign and are statistically significant at the 1% level.
1.6 Additional Analysis
In this section, we examine whether there is any cross-sectional variation in the effects of IFRS adoption on
cost of equity. Table 1.7 presents the results of the subsample analysis. The table reports the coefficients of the
IFRSravg dummy, the standard errors, and the number of observations for each subsample.
Panel A presents the results of the analysis for the subsamples split by the increase in the exposure of banks to
fair value (∆FV). The coefficient of the IFRSravg is negative and statistically significant only for the subsample
of banks with above median ∆FV. This finding is consistent with papers that argue that fair value accounting
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Table 1.5
Effect of IFRS Adoption on Cost of Equity
Independent variables Predicted sign ravg
Intercept 0.161***
(0.007)
IFRSravg ? −0.009***
(0.003)
Beta + 0.010***
(0.002)
Ln(Total Assets) − −0.00003
(0.0005)
Ln(Book to Market) + 0.020***
(0.002)
Ln(Financial Leverage) + −0.013***
(0.004)
Ln(Beta Volatility) + 0.003**
(0.001)
Forecast Bias + 0.0004
(0.0004)
Expected Inflation + −0.189**
(0.081)
Year/ Country Dummies Included
Adj. R2 39.57%
# of firm-year observations 1,997
# of distinct banks 605
# of countries 37
# of years 6
This table presents the results of the regression on model 1.1. We use Ordinary Least Squares to estimate the regression coefficients and
the standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and are clustered by bank. The standard errors are reported in parentheses below the
coefficient estimates. All variables are as defined in Appendix B. *, **, and *** significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively, all
two-tailed.
provides relevant information to investors (e.g., Bleck and Liu [2007]) and is not in line with the idea that fair
value accounting can be suboptimal for banks (e.g., Plantin et al. [2008]). The difference in the coefficients of
the two subsamples is not statistically different from zero. Hence, we find no evidence of lower capital market
benefits for banks with high exposure to fair value accounting. Nonetheless, our findings should be interpreted
with caution because of the endogenous nature of our partitioning variable. The variable ∆FV is endogenously
determined because managers have discretion over the classification and measurement of financial assets.6
6In table 1.7, panel A the sum of the observations of the two subsamples (i.e., 1,747 and 1,743) is higher
than the number of bank-year observations for the cost-of-equity sample (i.e., 1,997). This happens because
we split only the treatment sample by the variable ∆FV. In each subsample regression, we use all the available
observations of non-European banks as a control sample. We follow this procedure because the variable ∆FV
can only be defined for the treatment sample. We do the same for the subsample regressions of panels B and
C. In this case, the reason is that more than half of the bank-year observations of the control sample regard
U.S. banks. As a result, we cannot split the control sample in two equal subsamples. In panels D and E, we
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Table 1.6
Effect of IFRS Adoption on Liquidity
Independent variables Predicted sign Ln(liquidityAmihud)
Intercept 11.351***
(0.284)
IFRSliquidity ? 0.032
(0.037)
Ln(Return Volatility) + 0.549***
(0.042)
Ln(Market Value of Equity) − −0.959***
(0.035)
Ln(Share Turnover) − −0.635***
(0.029)
Year Dummies Included
R2 within 80.95%
# of firm-year observations 4,562
# of distinct banks 1,068
# of countries 49
# of years 6
This table presents the results of the regression on model 1.2. We use Fixed Effects to estimate the regression coefficients and the standard
errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and are clustered by bank. The standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficient
estimates. All variables are as defined in Appendix B. *, **, and *** significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively, all two-tailed.
Panel B and panel C present the results of the analyses for the subsamples split by Absence and Divergence,
respectively. We expect that the impact of IFRS will be more pronounced for banks operating in countries with
larger dissimilarities between domestic accounting standards and IFRS. Regarding Absence, the decrease in the
cost of equity is statistically nonsignificant in both subsamples. In the case of Divergence, the decrease in the
cost of equity is only present in the subsample of European banks with above-median Divergence. Again, the
differences in the coefficients of the subsamples are not statistically different from zero. The nonsignificant
results are most likely due to noise in the proxies for the differences between domestic accounting standards and
IFRS.
Panel D presents the results of the subsample analysis for banks with below-median and banks with above-median
pre-adoption quality of the information environment (InfoQuality). We expect that banks with poor pre-adoption
information quality will enjoy larger marginal benefits as a result of the IFRS adoption. Consistent with our
expectations, the decrease in the cost of equity is larger for the subsample of banks with below-median pre-
adoption information quality. The difference in the coefficients of the two subsamples is positive and significant
split both the treatment and the control sample by InfoQuality and InfoAsymmetry, respectively. The sum of the
observations of the subsamples in panels D and E is smaller than the number of bank-year observations for the
cost-of-equity sample. The reason is the increased data required for the construction of the variables InfoQuality
and InfoAsymmetry.
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at the 1% level. This finding is in line with Armstrong et al. [2010] who find a significant market reaction to
events affecting the probability of IFRS adoption in Europe only for banks with low pre-adoption information
quality.
Panel E reports the results of the subsample analysis for banks with below-median and banks with above-median
pre-adoption information asymmetry between banks and investors as well as between investors (InfoAsymmetry).
The level of pre-adoption information asymmetry can both moderate and accentuate the positive impact of IFRS
adoption. On the one hand, IFRS can decrease information asymmetries by mandating increased disclosures
and by making financial statements across countries more comparable. On the other hand, increased disclosure
requirements can have adverse effects on banks with higher pre-adoption information asymmetry due to high
proprietary costs of disclosure. Our analysis shows that the decrease in the cost of equity is only present in
the subsample of banks with below-median information asymmetry. Our results provide weak support to the
idea that IFRS can be suboptimal for banks with high proprietary costs of disclosure. Still, the difference in the
coefficients of the two subsamples is not statistically significant.
Overall, the subsample analysis does not support the idea that increased use of fair value accounting can have
adverse effects on banks. Further, our tests provide evidence of higher capital market benefits for banks with low
pre-adoption quality of the information environment.
1.7 Untabulated Robustness Tests
1.7.1 Alternative Proxies for the Cost of Equity and Liquidity
To test the sensitivity of our results to the perpetual growth rate assumption, we use expected inflation as our
alternative proxy for the perpetual growth rate in the estimation of the cost of equity (Hail and Leuz [2006]).
We measure expected inflation as the median annualized one-year-ahead change in the country-specific CPI.
We replace negative values with the average of historical country-specific estimates. The results of our analysis
are similar to those of table 1.5; the coefficient of the IFRSravg dummy is equal to −0.007 and is statistically
significant at the 5% level.
For liquidity, we use bid-ask spread and zero returns as alternative proxies. We calculate bid-ask spread as the
yearly median of the daily ask prices minus the daily bid prices divided by the midpoint. We measure zero
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Table 1.7
Subsample Regressions for the Cost of Equity
Panel A: Subsamples split by ∆FV
Low ∆FV High ∆FV High ∆FV − Low ∆FV
IFRSravg coeff. −0.007 −0.008* −0.001
std.err. (0.005) (0.004)
N 1,747 1,743
Panel B: Subsamples split by Absence
High Absense
Low Absence High Absence − Low Absence
IFRSravg coeff. −0.004 −0.006 −0.002
std.err. (0.004) (0.004)
N 1,750 1,787
Panel C: Subsamples split by Divergence
High Divergence
Low Divergence High Divergence − Low Divergence
IFRSravg coeff. −0.005 −0.008** −0.003
std.err. (0.004) (0.004)
N 1,743 1,794
Panel D: Subsamples split by InfoQuality
High InfoQuality
Low InfoQuality High InfoQuality − Low InfoQuality
IFRSravg coeff. −0.022*** 0.009* 0.031***
std.err. (0.004) (0.004)
N 935 933
Panel E: Subsamples split by InfoAsymmetry
High InfoAsymmetry
Low InfoAsymmetry High InfoAsymmetry − Low InfoAsymmetry
IFRSravg coeff. −0.007* −0.006 0.001
std.err. (0.004) (0.005)
N 883 884
This table presents the results of the subsample regressions on model 1.1. In panel A, we split the sample in bank-year observations with
below-median values of ∆FV (Low ∆FV) and bank-year observations with above-median values of ∆FV (High ∆FV). In panels B, C,
D, and E we split the samples by Absence, Divergence, InfoQuality, and InfoAsymmetry, respectively. We use Ordinary Least Squares to
estimate the regression coefficients and the standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and are clustered by bank. The standard errors are
reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. All variables are as defined in Appendix B. *, **, and *** significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% level, respectively, all two-tailed.
returns as the number of days with zero returns within a year divided by the number of trading days for that
year. The coefficient of the IFRSliquidity dummy is equal to −0.119 and is statistically significant at the 5%
level, when we use bid-ask spread as a proxy for liquidity. The coefficient of the test variable is equal to −0.113
and is significant at the 1% level, when we use zero returns as proxy for liquidity. These findings contradict the
nonsignificant findings when we use the Amihud [2002] illiquidity measure as our proxy for liquidity.
Capital market effects of mandatory IFRS adoption on banks 21
1.7.2 Alternative Specification of the Control Sample
We examine the sensitivity of our results to the construction of the control sample. As robustness test, we use
observations only from the U.S. as a control sample (Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas [2010]). We use a sample
of U.S. banks because U.S. companies operate in similar capital market environments and under similar regula-
tory requirements as European companies. In addition, there is high integration and economic interdependence
between European and U.S. markets. The results of the robustness test are similar to the results of the main
analysis for the cost of equity; the coefficient of the IFRSravg is equal to −0.015 and is statistically significant at
the 1% level. However, the coefficient of the variable IFRSliquidity is equal to 0.252 and it becomes statistically
significant at the 1% level.
1.7.3 Other
We also repeat the analyses for the cost-of-equity and liquidity models, but now we winsorize the variables at
the 1% level instead of truncating them. The coefficient of the IFRSravg dummy for the cost-of-equity model is
equal to−0.009 and is significant at the 1% level and the coefficient of the IFRSliquidity dummy for the liquidity
model is equal to 0.032 and is statistically nonsignificant. So, our results are not sensitive to the winsorization of
the variables.
Moreover, to calculate the cost-of-equity proxy we assume that the fiscal year of all firms ends in December.
We exclude firms with other than December fiscal year-end and rerun model 1.1. Again, the coefficient of
the IFRSravg dummy is equal to −0.011 and is statistically significant at the 1% level. We also examine the
sensitivity of our results to the existence of extreme observations for the Amihud [2002] illiquidity proxy. We do
so by truncating the Amihud illiquidity proxy at the 5 and 95% level instead of the 1 and 99% level used so far
and rerun model 1.2. The IFRSliquidity dummy remains positive and statistically nonsignificant.
Finally, the results of our main analyses are robust to clustering the errors by both bank and year (Petersen
[2009]). All untabulated results are available on request.
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1.8 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the effects of mandatory IFRS adoption on the cost of equity and liquidity of European
banks. Our main analysis shows a statistically and economically significant decrease in the cost of equity of
banks by ninety basis points after the mandatory adoption of IFRS. Our subsample analysis does not provide
support to the concerns of academics and practitioners that fair value is suboptimal for banks. Further, the
decrease in the cost of equity is more pronounced for banks with lower pre-adoption quality of information
environment. Regarding the effect of IFRS on liquidity, our results are sensitive to the proxy used. In particular,
we find no effect when we use the Amihud [2002] illiquidity measure as our proxy for liquidity. However, we
find a significant increase in liquidity when we use either bid-ask spread or zero returns as proxies for liquidity.
Overall, our results are in line with theory that suggests that increased disclosure and increased comparability
of financial statements caused by the mandatory adoption of IFRS can have a positive impact on banks’ cost of
equity.
Our conclusions are relevant to policy makers and standard setters. In particular, our results do not support the
idea that fair value accounting can increase the systematic risk of financial institutions. On the contrary, we
show that fair value accounting can benefit investors by increasing the value relevance of accounting numbers
and by enhancing transparency. These results contribute to the ongoing debate on whether financial statements
should be more or less fair-value based. Moreover, our results support the idea that the harmonization of ac-
counting standards can have capital market benefits for adopting firms and support the efforts of standard setters
to achieve global convergence of financial reporting. In addition, our findings are relevant to academics because
they highlight the importance of industry characteristics in studies that examine the real effects of changes in
accounting regulations.
There are potential caveats related to our study. First, all European listed banks mandatorily report under IFRS
after 2005, so the choice of a control sample is difficult. Second, our study does not separate in a robust manner
the effects of increased disclosure requirements, increased comparability of financial statements, and increased
use of fair value accounting on the cost of equity of European banks. Nevertheless, our additional analysis on
the effect of IFRS on cost of equity conditional on the increase in the exposure of banks to fair value accounting
is a valid starting point. Finally, our sample period ends at the beginning of the financial crisis, which might
pose some limitations to the generalizability of our conclusions. Yet, given that stock prices reflect investor
expectations, we believe that our analysis does provide evidence of the effects of IFRS adoption on banks during
economic downturns.
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Appendix A. Cost-of-equity models
Claus and Thomas [2001]:
Pt = BV PSt +
AEt+1
(1 + rct)1
+
AEt+2
(1 + rct)2
+
AEt+3
(1 + rct)3
+
AEt+4
(1 + rct)4
+
AEt+5
(1 + rct)5
+
AEt+5(1 + glt)
(1 + rct)5(rct − glt)
(1.3)
This model is a variation of the residual income valuation model. Clean surplus accounting holds. For the first 3
years, we use the mean forecasted earnings per share provided by IBES. Whenever the forecast of earnings per
share for year 3 is unavailable, we calculate it as the mean forecasted earnings per share for year 2 times one plus
the long-term growth rate in earnings provided by IBES (ltg). Forecasted earnings per share for years 4 and 5
are equal to previous year’s forecasted earnings per share times one plus the ltg. From year 5 and on, the model
assumes a constant perpetual growth rate of abnormal earnings. P is market price of a firm’s stock. BVPS is book
value of equity per share. AE is abnormal earnings per share. AE is earnings per share at time t minus the cost
of equity times the book value of equity per share at time t−1. rct is the cost of equity and glt is the long-term
growth rate.
Easton [2004]:
Pt =
(FEPSt+2 + reDPSt+2 − FEPSt+1)
r2e
(1.4)
This model is a variation of the abnormal earnings growth valuation model suggested by Ohlson and Juettner-
Nauroth [2005]. FEPS is forecasted earnings per share. FEPS for year 1 and 2 are equal to the mean forecasted
earnings per share provided by IBES. P is market price of a firm’s stock. DPS is dividends per share. DPS is
calculated as net income multiplied by the dividend payout ratio. re is the cost of equity.
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Gode and Mohanram [2003]:
rgm = A+
√
A2 +
FEPSt+1
Pt
(gst − glt) (1.5)
where
A =
1
2
(glt +
DPSt+1
Pt
) (1.6)
This model is a variation of the abnormal earnings growth valuation model suggested by Ohlson and Juettner-
Nauroth [2005]. FEPS is forecasted earnings per share. FEPS are equal to the mean forecasted earnings per
share provided by IBES. The short-term growth in earnings (gst) is equal to the average of the two-year growth
forecast and the ltg. ltg is the long-term growth rate in earnings provided by IBES. rgm is the cost of equity. P is
market price of a firm’s stock. glt is long-term growth rate and DPS is dividends per share. DPS is calculated as
net income multiplied by the dividend payout ratio.
Gebhardt et al. [2001]:
Pt = BV PSt +
FROEt+1 − rgls
(1 + rgls)
BV PSt +
FROEt+2 − rgls
(1 + rgls)2
BV PSt+1 + TV (1.7)
where
TV =
T−1∑
i=3
FROEt+i − rgls
(1 + rgls)i
BV PSt+i−1 +
FROEt+T − rgls
rgls(1 + rgls)T−1
BV PSt+T−1 (1.8)
This model is a variation of the residual income valuation model. Clean surplus accounting holds. FROE is
forecasted return on book value of equity. FROE is calculated as FEPS divided by lagged BVPS. FEPS is
forecasted earnings per share. BVPS is book value of equity per share. For the first 3 years, we use the mean
forecasted earnings per share provided by IBES to calculate the FROE. Whenever the mean forecasted earnings
per share for year 3 is unavailable, we use the mean forecasted earnings per share for year 2 multiplied by one
plus the ltg. ltg is the long-term growth rate in earnings provided by IBES. From year 4 to year 12, we calculate
FROE using linear interpolation to the industry median return on equity. From year 12 and on, the model assumes
zero perpetual growth in abnormal earnings. To calculate the industry median return on equity, we exclude firms
with negative net income. We calculate the industry median return on equity using observations of banks (SIC
code 6000–6199) from at least five and up to ten years, depending on data availability. The industry median
return on equity is country-specific. P is market price of a firm’s stock. rgls is the cost of equity and TV is
terminal value.
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Appendix B. Variables definition
Variable name Variable description
ravg average of four different implied cost-of-equity estimates: rct, re, rgm, and rgls
rct cost-of-equity estimate using the model suggested by Claus and Thomas [2001]
re cost-of-equity estimate using the model suggested by Easton [2004]
rgm cost-of-equity estimate using the model suggested by Ohlson and Juettner-
Nauroth [2005] as implemented by Gode and Mohanram [2003]
rgls cost-of-equity estimate using the model suggested by Gebhardt et al. [2001]
liquidityAmihud yearly median of the Amihud [2002] illiquidity measure multiplied by 1 mil-
lion
IFRSravg dummy variable that takes the value of one if the company mandatorily reports
under IFRS, and zero otherwise
Beta covariance of monthly stock returns to a broad country-specific equity index
divided by the variance of that index, over the past five years
Total Assets total assets measured in U.S. dollars at year end
Book to Market ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity at year end
Financial Leverage ratio of total liabilities to total assets at year end
Beta Volatility standard deviation of daily betas over the last five years. Daily betas are calcu-
lated using daily observations over the past year
Forecast Bias one-year-ahead mean analyst consensus forecast minus the year’s actual earn-
ings scaled by book value per share
Expected Inflation median annualized one-year-ahead change in the country-specific CPI
IFRSliquidity dummy variable that takes the value of one if the company mandatorily reports
under IFRS, and zero otherwise
Return Volatility standard deviation of monthly returns calculated over the last year
Market Value of Equity market value of shareholders’ equity measured in U.S. dollars at year end
Share Turnover annual trading volume divided by the market value of equity
Ln(Total Assets) natural logarithm of total assets measured in U.S. dollars at year end
Ln(Book to Market) natural logarithm of the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity
at year end
Ln(Financial Leverage) natural logarithm of the ratio of total liabilities to total assets at year end
Ln(Beta Volatility) natural logarithm of the standard deviation of daily betas over the last five years
Year Dummies set of dummy variables that take the value of one if the bank-year observation
corresponds to a year, and zero otherwise
Country Dummies set of dummy variables that take the value of one if the bank operates in a
country, and zero otherwise
Ln(liquidityAmihud) natural logarithm of the yearly median of the Amihud [2002] illiquidity mea-
sure multiplied by one million
Ln(Return Volatility) natural logarithm of the standard deviation of monthly returns calculated over
the last year
(Continued)
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Appendix B – Continued
Variable name Variable description
Ln(Market Value of Equity) natural logarithm of the market value of shareholders’ equity measured in U.S.
dollars at year end
Ln(Share Turnover) natural logarithm of the annual trading volume divided by the market value of
equity
∆FV ratio of financial assets measured at fair value to total assets in the 2004 finan-
cial statements prepared under IFRS minus the ratio of financial assets mea-
sured at fair value to total assets in the 2004 financial statements prepared un-
der domestic accounting standards. This variable is only applicable to banks
that report under IFRS
Absence measure of the extent to which accounting rules regarding specific topics are
covered in IAS but are not covered in domestic accounting standards (Ding
et al. [2007]). This variable is only applicable to banks that report under IFRS
Divergence measure of the extent to which accounting rules regarding specific topics differ
between IAS and domestic accounting standards (Ding et al. [2007]). This
variable is only applicable to banks that report under IFRS
InfoQuality first principal component derived from the variables ADR, Standards, Ex-
changes, and Market Value of Equity (Armstrong et al. [2010])
ADR dummy variable that takes the value of one if the bank participates in an Amer-
ican Depository Receipt program, and zero otherwise
Standards dummy variable that takes the value of one if the bank reports under U.S. stan-
dards or IAS, and zero otherwise
Exchanges number of exchanges on which the bank is listed
InfoAsymmetry first principal component derived from the variables Turnover, CloselyHeld,
and BankConcentration (Armstrong et al. [2010])
Turnover annual mean of daily ratio of shares traded to shares outstanding
CloselyHeld percentage of shares held by insiders
BankConcentration country-specific ratio of the assets of the three largest banks to the assets of all
commercial banks (Beck et al. [2010])
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Impact of IFRS on banks’ risk exposure∗
2.1 Introduction
Banks’ adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) has sparked a heated debate both among
practitioners and within the academic community regarding its potential benefits and costs. Proponents of IFRS
argue that it increases the value relevance of accounting numbers (e.g., Barth et al. [1996]) and it enhances market
transparency (e.g., Bleck and Liu [2007]). At the same time, concerns have been raised that IFRS can, among
others, make banks more procyclical (e.g., Allen and Carletti [2008]) and it can increase earnings’ volatility
(e.g., Barth et al. [1995]). Despite the controversial nature of IFRS, there are only a few academic papers
that empirically study the economic consequences of the new accounting standards particularly for banks (e.g.,
Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas [2010]). Our paper contributes to this stream of literature by investigating the
impact of mandatory IFRS adoption on the risk exposure of banks in Europe.
The two changes mandated by IFRS that can potentially impact the risk exposure of adopting banks are increased
use of fair value accounting and increased disclosure requirements for derivatives and hedges. On the one hand,
theory suggests that fair value accounting and increased disclosure requirements for hedges and derivatives can
increase market transparency and can enhance managerial discipline (e.g., Bleck and Liu [2007]). On the other
hand, a number of analytical papers argue that fair value accounting and increased hedging disclosures can lead
to increased managerial risk taking and suboptimal hedging (e.g., Burkhardt and Strausz [2006]). Consequently,
the impact of IFRS on banks’ risk exposure remains an empirical question.
∗This chapter is based on Gkougkousi et al. [2011]. We thank the workshop participants at Rotterdam School
of Management, Erasmus University and the session participants at the American Accounting Association An-
nual Meeting 2011 for helpful comments.
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To answer this research question, we first measure the exposure of banks to equity risk, interest rate risk, exchange
rate risk, and commodity risk as the absolute values of the beta coefficients that we derive by regressing monthly
bank returns on monthly equity market returns, monthly interest rate changes, monthly exchange rate changes,
and monthly commodity price changes over a year, respectively (Guay [1999]). Then, we regress these risk-
exposure proxies on a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the bank reports under IFRS and zero
otherwise and on a set of control variables. As additional analysis, we examine whether there is any cross-
sectional variation in the impact of mandatory IFRS adoption on banks’ risk exposure. In particular, we examine
whether the impact of IFRS depends on the likelihood that accounting numbers are used for contracting purposes,
on the difference between local accounting standards and IFRS, and on the degree of requlatory restrictions
imposed on banks’ activities. We expect that the impact of IFRS will be more pronounced in countries where
accounting numbers are more likely to be used for contracting purposes because in these countries accounting
numbers are used more often in managerial compensation contracts. Therefore, managers operating in these
countries have more incentives to adjust the banks’ risk exposure as a response to changes in financial statements
caused by the adoption of IFRS. Moreover, we expect that the impact of IFRS will be more pronounced in
countries where local accounting standards differ more from IFRS and in countries where managers have more
leeway in determining the banks’ investment positions.
We focus on the effect of mandatory adoption of IFRS to circumvent possible endogeneity issues associated with
the voluntary adoption of accounting standards. Further, we limit our analysis to European banks for two rea-
sons. First, European countries adopted the same amended version of International Accounting Standards (IAS)
39 in 2005. So, we focus on European banks to ensure homogeneity of the adopted standards. Second, literature
suggests that changes in regulations can have an economic impact only if they are properly enforced (e.g., Bhat-
tacharya and Daouk [2002]). The enforcement of rules and regulations in Europe is relatively high, so we use
a sample of European banks to increase the power of our tests. To control for synchronous and unrelated to the
adoption of IFRS changes (e.g., changes in macroeconomic conditions), we use U.S. banks as a control sample
(Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas [2010]). Our final sample consists of 8,847 bank-year observations representing
1,100 distinct banks from 23 countries for the period January 1999 to December 2010.
Our analysis shows an increase in the banks’ risk exposure after the mandatory adoption of IFRS in 2005. Our
results are not sensitive to the exclusion of the subprime mortgage crisis period. We provide limited support to
the hypothesis that the change in risk exposure is more pronounced in countries where accounting numbers are
more likely to be used for contracting purposes. Overall, our findings are in line with the theory that fair value
accounting and increased disclosure requirements of hedging activities can increase the risk exposure of banks
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by increasing managerial risk appetite and by inducing suboptimal hedging.
Our study contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, we provide evidence on the real effects of
changes in accounting regulations and more specifically on the real effects of changes in the hedge and fair value
accounting rules. To our knowledge, our paper is the first to examine the impact of changes in these two specific
accounting rules on banks’ activities. Second, prior literature explores the impact of IFRS adoption on, among
others, cost of equity, liquidity, earnings management, and analysts’ forecasts. We examine the impact of IFRS
on a relatively unexplored area, that is on the investment and hedging decisions of banks. Third, our study adds
to the growing body of literature on the economic consequences of IFRS adoption (e.g., Daske et al. [2008]; Li
[2010]; Byard et al. [2010]). However, in contrast to the majority of the papers in this research stream, we focus
on banks. This industry focus is important because accounting standards can have different impact on different
industrial sectors. Fourth, our study has regulatory implications as it contributes to the ongoing debate on the
global convergence of financial reporting standards. More specifically, we show that changes in accounting
standards can have unintended economic consequences on the investment and hedging positions of banks. We
find that banks have increased their exposures to a number of risk factors after the mandatory adoption of IFRS in
2005. Nevertheless—to the extent that these risks are diversifiable—our results do not suggest that the adoption
of IFRS has adverse consequences on banks.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. We develop the hypotheses in section 2.2. We discuss the
research design in section 2.3. In section 2.4, we present the sample and some descriptive statistics. Section 2.5
presents the results of the main and the subsample analysis. We present the robustness tests in section 2.6 and in
section 2.7, we conclude.
2.2 Hypotheses Development
The adoption of IFRS has caused an increase in the reporting of assets and liabilities at fair value and an increase
in the risk management disclosure requirements. There is disagreement in the literature regarding the economic
consequences of increased use of fair value accounting particularly for banks. Bleck and Liu [2007] argue that
fair value accounting—compared to historical cost accounting—facilitates the monitoring of banks’ activities
and provides investors with an early warning signal. The reason is that under fair value accounting managers
profit from asset appreciations but also get penalized for asset depreciations. On the contrary, under historical
cost accounting managers can sell appreciated assets and profit from gains on sales but at the same time they can
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keep depreciated assets on balance sheet and avoid realizing losses.
Nevertheless, a number of analytical papers argue that fair value accounting can have adverse consequences on
banks’ activities. More specifically, theory suggests that increased use of fair value accounting can increase
managerial risk appetite and can increase the riskiness of banks’ positions. For example, Burkhardt and Strausz
[2006] argue that fair value accounting reduces the information asymmetry between a bank and its investors
and it increases the liquidity of the bank’s assets. Due to the highly levered nature of banks, bank managers
have increased incentives to take on more risk. So, increased use of fair value accounting improves the bank’s
investment opportunities and ultimately aggravates the bank managers’ risk-shifting behavior. Bleck and Gao
[2011] show that fair value accounting induces banks to retain excessive exposure to the loans they originate and
the logic behind their proposition is as follows. Banks must retain a portion of the loans they originate to signal
their quality to the market. Under fair value accounting, loan retention is more valuable to all banks because
they can benefit from early profit recognition by marking-to-market the retained portion of the loan. So, bad
banks have more incentives to mimic good banks by retaining a larger portion of the loans they originate. At the
same time good banks must retain a larger portion of loans in order to distinguish themselves from bad banks.
Consequently, loan retention is higher under fair value compared to historical cost accounting in equilibrium.
To sum up, theoretical literature is divided as to whether increased use of fair value accounting can improve
managerial discipline or it can accentuate banks’ risk-taking behavior.
Literature on the effect of increased disclosure requirements for hedges and derivatives is also inconclusive. De-
Marzo and Duffie [1995] show that full disclosure of hedging activities destroys the incentives of managers to
fully hedge the firm’s risk exposure. The intuition is as follows. Disclosure of hedging activities makes firm
profits more informative about managerial talent. As a result, the sensitivity of management compensation to
firm profitability increases. Assuming constant variability of firm profits, this higher sensitivity of management
compensation to firm profitability leads to increased volatility of managerial wages. Hence, under full disclosure
of hedging activities, managers choose not to hedge the firm’s risk exposure in order to reduce the variability
of their income stream. Sapra [2002] reaches to similar conclusions. He argues that managers use hedging to
credibly signal their beliefs about the firm’s future prospects. Mandatory hedge disclosures increase managerial
incentives to take risky positions that indicate favorable private information about the firm’s prospects. Conse-
quently, mandatory hedge disclosures can increase managerial speculation and risk taking. A recent survey by
Lins et al. [2011] confirms the theoretical predictions of DeMarzo and Duffie [1995] and Sapra [2002] by docu-
menting that reporting for derivatives and hedges under SFAS 133 and IAS 39 has compromised firms’ economic
hedging strategies.
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On the contrary, Melumad et al. [1999] show that higher transparency of hedging activities can result in optimal
hedging of firms’ risk exposure. More specifically, the authors argue that hedge disclosures reduce the variance of
the firm’s expected payoffs because hedge disclosures reduce uncertainty. This decrease in variance compensates
the costs of hedging and makes it more profitable for managers to hedge the firm’s risk exposure. The theoretical
predictions of Melumad et al. [1999] are supported by the empirical findings of Zhang [2009].
Overall, literature suggests that IFRS can impact both the banks’ investment and the banks’ hedging decisions by
mandating increased use of fair value accounting and increased disclosures of hedging activities. Based on the
theory provided by Bleck and Liu [2007] and Melumad et al. [1999], it is reasonable to expect that the adoption
of IFRS will lead to better monitoring of managerial activities and to improved hedging of the bank’s risks and
consequently to lower risk exposure. However, based on the theoretical predictions of Bleck and Gao [2011],
DeMarzo and Duffie [1995], and Sapra [2002], we expect that IFRS will cause an increase in the risk exposure
of adopting firms. So, we formulate the following two-directional hypothesis.
H1a: The risk exposure of banks decreases after the adoption of IFRS.
H1b: The risk exposure of banks increases after the adoption of IFRS.
In line with Lins et al. [2011], we expect that the change in the risk exposure of banks will be more pronounced
in countries where accounting numbers are more likely to be used in management compensation contracts. The
reason is that in these countries managerial compensation will be more heavily affected by the adoption of IFRS.
As a result, managers have stronger incentives to adjust the firm’s risk exposure as a response to the adoption of
IFRS.
H2: The effect of IFRS on risk exposure is more pronounced for banks operating in countries where accounting
numbers are used more often for contracting purposes.
We also expect that the impact of IFRS on banks’ risk exposure will be more pronounced for banks operating in
countries where local accounting standards differ more from IFRS. Larger differences between local accounting
standards and IFRS will result in larger changes in banks’ financial statements. Subsequently, managers operating
in these countries will make more adjustments to the firm’s investment and hedging positions as a response to
the IFRS adoption.
H3: The effect of IFRS on risk exposure is more pronounced for banks operating in countries where local ac-
counting standards differ more from IFRS.
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The change in banks’ risk exposure caused by the mandatory adoption of IFRS also depends on the degree of
regulatory restrictions imposed on banks’ activities. Managers operating in countries that impose fewer regu-
latory restrictions will have more flexibility to adjust the banks’ risk exposure as a response to the adoption of
IFRS. Hence, we expect that the change in the risk exposure of banks will be more pronounced in countries
where banks have more investment freedom.
H4: The effect of IFRS on risk exposure is more pronounced for banks operating in countries where there are
less regulatory restrictions on banks’ investment activities.
2.3 Research Design
To measure risk exposure, we use the methodology proposed by Guay [1999]. We focus on equity exposure,
interest rate exposure, exchange rate exposure, and commodity exposure because these are the main risks to
which banks are exposed. We measure equity exposure as the absolute value of the beta coefficient that we derive
by regressing monthly stock returns on monthly returns of an equity market index over a year. We measure
interest rate exposure as the absolute value of the beta coefficient that we derive by regressing monthly stock
returns on monthly returns of an equity market index and monthly percentage changes in interest rates over a
year. We measure exchange rate exposure as the absolute value of the beta coefficient that we obtain when we
regress monthly stock returns on monthly returns of an equity market index and monthly percentage changes in
exchange rates over a year. And we measure commodity exposure as the absolute value of the beta coefficient that
we get by regressing monthly stock returns on monthly returns of an equity market index and monthly percentage
changes in commodity prices over a year.1 Hence, we run time-series regressions at bank-month level over a year
on the following models:
Returnit = α0i + α1iReturnmt + ωit (2.1)
Returnit = β0i + β1iReturnmt + β2iInterestt + it (2.2)
Returnit = γ0i + γ1iReturnmt + γ2iExchanget + ηit (2.3)
Returnit = δ0i + δ1iReturnmt + δ2iCommodityt + υit (2.4)
1We use monthly instead of daily or weekly returns because they are less noisy. Further, beta estimates using
monthly returns suffer less from downwards bias related to the infrequent trading of stocks.
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where Returni is the continuously compounded monthly stock return of bank i; Returnm is the continuously
compounded country-specific value-weighted monthly equity market return; Interest is the monthly percentage
change in overnight LIBOR; Exchange is the monthly percentage change in the European Central Bank trade-
weighted euro denominated exchange rate basket of a group of 40 trading partners for the case of European banks
and the monthly percentage change in the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis trade-weighted dollar denominated
exchange rate basket of major currencies for the case of U.S. banks; and Commodity is the monthly percentage
change in the Dow Jones-UBS value-weighted euro denominated commodity index. The absolute values of the
coefficients α1i, β2i, γ2i, and δ2i capture the bank- and year-specific exposures to equity risk (Equity Exposure),
interest rate risk (Interest Exposure), exchange rate risk (Exchange Exposure), and commodity risk (Commodity
Exposure), respectively.
Next, we regress these measures of risk exposure on a dummy variable called IFRS that takes the value of one
if the company mandatorily reports under IFRS and zero otherwise and on a set of control variables. The set of
control variables includes Return Volatility, calculated as the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over a
year; Total Assets, calculated as the natural logarithm of total assets measured in U.S. dollars; Book to Market,
calculated as book value of equity to market value of equity; Financial Leverage, calculated as total liabilities
to total assets; ROA, calculated as net income to total assets; Loans to Assets, calculated as total loans to total
assets; Deposits to Assets, calculated as total deposits to total assets; and Noninterest to Total Income, calculated
as noninterest income to total income (Zhang [2009]; Fraser et al. [2002]). All accounting variables are lagged
one year to ensure that financial statement information is publicly available and are measured at fiscal year end.
In addition, all variables are winsorized at the 1% level. So, we run pooled regressions at bank-year level on the
following models:
Equity Exposureit = α2 + α3IFRSit +
N∑
n=4
αn × Controlnit + ω′it (2.5)
Interest Exposureit = β3 + β4IFRSit +
K∑
k=5
βk × Controlkit + ′it (2.6)
Exchange Exposureit = γ3 + γ4IFRSit +
K∑
k=5
γk × Controlkit + η′it (2.7)
Commodity Exposureit = δ3 + δ4IFRSit +
K∑
k=5
δk × Controlkit + υ′it (2.8)
To test whether the change in risk exposure is more pronounced in countries where accounting numbers are more
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likely to be used for contracting purposes, we run subsample regressions and we compare the coefficients of the
IFRS dummies. We use two proxies to capture the extent to which accounting numbers are used in contracts.
First, we use the variable Burden of Proof, which measures the country-specific level of difficulty to prove
liability of accountants due to misleading financial statements (La Porta et al. [2006]). Higher values of Burden
of Proof are associated with lower likelihood that accounting numbers are used in contracts. Second, we use the
variable Reporting Quality, which is equal to the CIFAR score and it measures the country-specific quality of
financial reporting. Higher values of Reporting Quality are positively associated with the likelihood that financial
statement numbers are used in management compensation contracts.
We also test for cross-sectional variation depending on the difference between local accounting standards and
IFRS. We measure the differences between local accounting standards and IFRS using the variables Absence and
Divergence calculated by Ding et al. [2007]. Absence measures the extent to which accounting rules regarding
specific topics are covered in IFRS but are not covered in domestic accounting standards. Divergence measures
the extent to which accounting rules regarding specific topics differ between IFRS and local accounting standards.
Further, we test for cross-sectional variation depending on the degree of investment restrictions imposed on
banks’ activities. We measure country-specific investment restrictions using the variable Investment Freedom
calculated by Barth, Caprio and Levine [2008].
We estimate models 2.1–2.4 using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and models 2.5–2.8 using Fixed Effects (FE)
estimation technique to control for the impact of time-invariant firm-fixed effects. We also examine the appropri-
ateness of the Random Effects (RE) technique for models 2.5–2.8 by means of the Hausman [1978] specification
test. However, the test rejects the null hypothesis that the RE produces consistent estimators. The standard errors
are robust to heteroscedasticity and are clustered by bank.
2.4 Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics
2.4.1 Sample Selection
Our treatment sample consists of banks (primary SIC code 6000–6199) that belong to the European Union
(E.U.) and/or to the European Economic Area (E.E.A.) and our control sample consists of U.S. banks. Our
sample period spans from January 1999 to December 2010. We use an equal number of years before and after
the mandatory adoption of IFRS in 2005. We exclude firms with other than December fiscal year end to better
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align our proxies for risk exposure with the mandatory adoption of IFRS. We require a minimum of 12 months
of return data per year to estimate the parameters of models 2.1–2.4. We include only mandatory adopters in our
sample to circumvent endogeneity issues that arise from the voluntary adoption of IFRS. We retrieve market data
from Datastream, the European Central Bank website, and the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis website and
accounting information from Worldscope. We download the CIFAR score from the website of Andrei Shleifer
and data to calculate the variable Investment Freedom from the World Bank website. Table 2.1 presents the
sample selection procedure. Our selection criteria and data requirements result in loss of about 12% of the initial
bank-month observations. Our final sample is equal to 106,164 bank-month observations, which corresponds to
8,847 bank-year data points.
Table 2.1
Sample Selection
Description N %
initial bank-month obs. with available data 121,023 100.00
minus bank-month obs. with other than December FYE 13,232 10.93
minus bank-month obs. with less than 12 months of return data per year 439 0.36
minus bank-month obs. of voluntary adopters 1,188 0.98
final bank-month observations 106,164 87.72
(final bank-year observations) (8,847)
This table presents the sample selection procedure.
2.4.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.2 presents the sample composition by country. Our sample comprises 8,847 bank-year observations
representing 1,100 distinct banks from 23 countries. The control sample of U.S. banks is more than double the
treatment sample of European banks. About 45% of the bank-year observations of the treatment sample regard
Danish, French, and Italian banks. The average number of bank-year observations per country for the treatment
sample is 120. The countries with the least observations available are Hungary, Iceland, and Luxembourg with
7, 2, and 3 bank-year observations, respectively.
Table 2.3 presents descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables of models 2.1 to 2.8. Panel
A presents descriptive statistics for the variables of models 2.1 to 2.4. The mean monthly bank-specific return is
negative and equal to−0.4% and the median is equal to 0. The mean monthly bank return is negative presumably
because our sample includes the subprime crisis period. Panel B presents descriptive statistics for the variables
of models 2.5 to 2.8. The mean (median) of Equity Exposure is equal to 0.34 (0.10). The low equity market
36 Chapter 2
Table 2.2
Sample Composition
Bank-year Bank
N % N %
Austria 69 0.78 8 0.73
Belgium 43 0.49 5 0.45
Czech Republic 21 0.24 4 0.36
Denmark 485 5.48 51 4.64
Finland 29 0.33 6 0.55
France 369 4.17 56 5.09
Germany 192 2.17 31 2.82
Greece 134 1.51 18 1.64
Hungary 7 0.08 1 0.09
Iceland 2 0.02 2 0.18
Ireland 17 0.19 2 0.18
Italy 343 3.88 51 4.64
Lithuania 13 0.15 3 0.27
Luxembourg 3 0.03 1 0.09
Netherlands 30 0.34 5 0.45
Norway 233 2.63 28 2.55
Poland 164 1.85 20 1.82
Portugal 69 0.78 10 0.91
Romania 10 0.11 2 0.18
Spain 166 1.88 18 1.64
Sweden 52 0.59 5 0.45
U.K. 183 2.07 27 2.45
U.S.A. 6,213 70.23 746 67.82
Total 8,847 100.00 1,100 100.00
This table presents the sample composition by country.
betas are probably due to the small number of observations used to run regressions on model 2.1 (i.e., 12 bank-
month observations per regression) and due to the defensive nature of bank stocks. The mean Interest Exposure,
Exchange Exposure, and Commodity Exposure are equal to 0.25, 1.22, and 0.53, respectively. About 11% of the
bank-year observations regard banks that report under IFRS. The distribution of the variable Noninterest to Total
Income departs greatly from normality despite the fact that the variable is winsorized at the 1% level. Our results
are qualitatively similar when we winsorize the variable Noninterest to Total Income at the 5% level.
Table 2.4 presents Spearman correlation coefficients between the dependent and independent variables of models
2.1 to 2.8. Panel A presents the correlation coefficients between the variables of models 2.1 to 2.4. Bank
returns are positively correlated with equity market returns, with changes in interest rates, and with changes in
commodity prices and negatively correlated with changes in exchange rates. Panel B presents the correlation
coefficients between selected variables of models 2.5 to 2.8. The test variable IFRS is positively and significantly
correlated with three out of four risk-exposure proxies; that is, the IFRS dummy is positively and significantly
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Table 2.3
Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Variables of models 2.1–2.4
Mean Median Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis N
Returni −0.004 0.000 0.099 −0.615 6.584 106,164
Returnm 0.000 0.007 1.161 −0.495 12.760 106,164
Interest −0.016 0.000 0.178 −0.150 5.494 106,164
Exchange −0.001 −0.001 0.019 0.077 3.111 106,164
Commodity 0.005 0.010 0.046 −0.516 3.564 106,164
Panel B: Variables of models 2.5–2.8
Mean Median Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis N
Equity Exposure 0.343 0.095 0.525 2.151 7.536 8,847
Interest Exposure 0.249 0.108 0.417 3.587 17.781 8,847
Exchange Exposure 1.217 0.858 1.206 2.045 8.726 8,847
Commodity Exposure 0.533 0.357 0.558 2.107 8.370 8,847
IFRS 0.114 0.000 0.318 2.427 6.888 8,847
Return Volatility 0.089 0.068 0.071 2.458 10.535 8,847
Total Assets 7.345 6.908 2.102 0.823 3.601 8,847
Book to Market 0.990 0.710 0.987 3.932 22.888 8,847
Financial Leverage 0.892 0.910 0.094 −4.878 31.063 8,847
ROA 9.047 3.175 13.633 3.377 21.690 8,847
Loans to Assets 0.694 0.706 0.140 −1.002 5.292 7,882
Deposits to Assets 0.686 0.742 0.185 −1.419 4.781 7,882
Noninterest to Total Income 0.107 0.002 0.846 39.746 2,432.356 7,882
This table presents descriptive statistics for the variables of models 2.1 to 2.4 (panel A) and the variables of models 2.5 to 2.8 (panel B). All
variables are as defined in Appendix C.
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related to Equity Exposure, Interest Exposure, and Exchange Exposure but is unrelated to Commodity Exposure.
There is high correlation between some of the independent variables of models 2.5 to 2.8 (e.g., ROA and Total
Assets). However, all variance inflation factors are below 3, so multicollinearity is not an issue in our models.
2.5 Results
Table 2.5 presents the results of the univariate analysis for the dependent variables of models 2.5 to 2.8. Panel
A reports the results of the univariate analysis for the treatment sample and panel B for the control sample. We
split both samples in bank-year observations before the mandatory adoption of IFRS in 2005 (pre-IFRS) and
after (post-IFRS). We report mean and median values as well as the differences in the means and medians across
subsamples. We use t-test to compare the means and Wilcoxon rank-sum test to compare the medians. There is
a statistically significant increase in the risk exposures of European banks after the adoption of IFRS in 2005. In
the case of U.S. banks the pattern is mixed; Interest Exposure, Exchange Exposure, and Commodity Exposure
increase after 2005 while Equity Exposure decreases. These findings provide preliminary evidence of increased
risk exposure of European banks after the mandatory adoption of IFRS in 2005.
Table 2.6 presents the results of our main analysis. Panel A reports the results of the regressions on the baseline
model when only Return Volatility, Total Assets, Book to Market, Financial Leverage, and ROA are used as
control variables. Panel B presents the results of the regressions when the baseline model is extended to include
controls that are only relevant to banks. So, we also include the variables Loans to Assets, Deposits to Assets, and
Noninterest to Total Income. The results of the regressions on the baseline model in panel A show a statistically
significant increase in the equity, exchange rate, and commodity risk exposures of European banks after the
mandatory adoption of IFRS in 2005. We find no evidence of change in the interest rate exposure of banks.
The coefficients of the control variables vary across the different models. This variation is most likely due to
the endogenous nature of the variables and the highly regulated nature of banks. The explanatory power of the
models ranges from 2.5% to 22.1%. The results of the regressions in panel B show a similar picture. Banks
increased their exposure to three out of four risk categories after the adoption of IFRS. The addition of controls
increases only moderately the explanatory power of our models. To sum up, the results of our main analysis
provide evidence in support of H1b; the mandatory adoption of IFRS is associated with an increase in the risk
exposure of European banks in our sample.
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Table 2.5
Univariate Analysis
Panel A: Treatment sample
Pre-IFRS Post-IFRS Post-IFRS − Pre-IFRS
Equity Exposure mean 0.552 0.842 0.290***
median 0.376 0.760 0.384***
Interest Exposure mean 0.123 0.287 0.164***
median 0.061 0.149 0.088***
Exchange Exposure mean 1.157 1.779 0.622***
median 0.767 1.275 0.508***
Commodity Exposure mean 0.387 0.494 0.107***
median 0.274 0.354 0.080***
Panel B: Control sample
Pre-IFRS Post-IFRS Post-IFRS − Pre-IFRS
Equity Exposure mean 0.360 0.093 −0.267***
median 0.062 0.036 −0.026***
Interest Exposure mean 0.113 0.398 0.285***
median 0.070 0.194 0.124***
Exchange Exposure mean 1.086 1.182 0.097***
median 0.826 0.836 0.010
Commodity Exposure mean 0.442 0.678 0.236***
median 0.307 0.465 0.158***
This table presents the results of the univariate analysis for the dependent variables of models 2.5 to 2.8. Panel A presents the results of the
univariate analysis for the treatment sample and panel B for the control sample. We split both samples in the period before the mandatory
adoption of IFRS in 2005 (pre-IFRS) and in the period after the mandatory adoption of IFRS in 2005 (post-IFRS). We use t-test to compare
the means and Wilcoxon rank-sum test to compare the medians. All variables are as defined in Appendix C. *, **, and *** represent
significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively, all two-tailed.
Table 2.6
Main Analysis
Panel A: Main model
Equity Interest Exchange Commodity
Independents Sign Exposure Exposure Exposure Exposure
Intercept 0.324** −0.853*** 0.829* −0.057
(2.122) (−4.902) (1.867) (−0.385)
IFRS + 0.256*** 0.008 0.670*** 0.046**
(8.939) (0.483) (10.629) (2.379)
Return Volatility + 0.611*** 0.147 8.899*** 3.448***
(5.449) (1.259) (26.771) (21.373)
Total Assets ± −0.039** 0.180*** 0.030 0.036***
(−2.422) (13.381) (0.796) (2.763)
Book to Market ± −0.032*** 0.137*** −0.172*** 0.077***
(−3.490) (9.999) (−6.908) (5.293)
Financial Leverage ± 0.250 −0.387** −0.604 −0.037
(1.565) (−2.312) (−1.185) (−0.242)
ROA ± 0.003** −0.003*** 0.001 −0.003***
(2.278) (−2.684) (0.504) (−2.912)
bank-year obs. 8,847 8,847 8,847 8,847
(Continued)
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Table 2.6 – Continued
Equity Interest Exchange Commodity
Independents Sign Exposure Exposure Exposure Exposure
distinct banks 1,100 1,100 1,100 1,100
countries 23 23 23 23
years 12 12 12 12
R2 within 2.45% 13.72% 20.79% 22.11%
Panel B: Extended model
Equity Interest Exchange Commodity
Independents Sign Exposure Exposure Exposure Exposure
Intercept 0.316 −1.021*** 1.783*** −0.042
(1.628) (−6.015) (2.611) (−0.181)
IFRS + 0.288*** −0.003 0.704*** 0.042**
(9.954) (−0.136) (10.948) (2.145)
Return Volatility + 0.589*** 0.069 9.387*** 3.573***
(5.017) (0.542) (27.003) (20.038)
Total Assets ± −0.038** 0.221*** −0.052 0.030**
(−2.284) (15.947) (−1.285) (1.973)
Book to Market ± −0.028*** 0.151*** −0.185*** 0.074***
(−2.606) (10.238) (−6.450) (4.739)
Financial Leverage ± 0.571*** −0.850*** −0.816 −0.074
(2.691) (−4.186) (−0.973) (−0.304)
ROA ± 0.005*** −0.006*** 0.004 −0.005***
(4.313) (−5.516) (1.558) (−3.901)
Loans to Assets − −0.489*** −0.355*** 0.062 0.038
(−5.568) (−4.421) (0.310) (0.446)
Deposits to Assets − 0.034 0.765*** −0.389 0.051
(0.307) (7.860) (−1.387) (0.501)
Noninterest to + −0.001 0.034*** 0.007 0.017***
Total Income (−0.165) (4.384) (0.733) (3.556)
bank-year obs. 7,882 7,882 7,882 7,882
distinct banks 982 982 982 982
countries 23 23 23 23
years 12 12 12 12
R2 within 3.51% 18.41% 22.71% 23.65%
This table presents the results of the regression analysis. Panel A presents the results of the regressions on the main model and panel B the
results of the regressions on the extended model. All variables are as defined in Appendix C. The model parameters are estimated using
Fixed Effects estimation technique and the standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered by bank. The t-statistics are reported
in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively, all two-tailed.
We repeat our analysis after excluding the period of the subprime crisis. We exclude this period because as-
set price volatility is higher and asset co-movements are more pronounced during crises (e.g., Hartmann et al.
[2004]). So, we exclude the years 2007, 2008, and 2009 and rerun the regressions on models 2.5 to 2.8. Table
2.7 presents the results of the regressions. Our main conclusions remain unchanged. The coefficients of the
IFRS dummies are positive and statistically significant in three out of four cases. Hence, after controlling for the
impact of the financial crisis, the adoption of IFRS remains associated with an increase in the risk exposure of
banks in the treatment sample.
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Table 2.7
Main Analysis Excluding the Crisis Period
Equity Interest Exchange Commodity
Independents Sign Exposure Exposure Exposure Exposure
Intercept 0.119 −2.198*** 2.083*** −0.093
(0.555) (−10.113) (2.770) (−0.372)
IFRS + 0.201*** −0.028 0.607*** 0.038*
(6.518) (−0.993) (8.381) (1.729)
Return Volatility + 1.470*** 2.821*** 9.883*** 4.628***
(6.289) (12.159) (18.772) (16.129)
Total Assets ± 0.004 0.451*** −0.028 0.058***
(0.183) (19.714) (−0.595) (2.999)
Book to Market ± −0.062*** 0.142*** −0.322*** 0.016
(−3.853) (7.327) (−8.183) (0.915)
Financial Leverage ± 0.347 −1.763*** −1.259 −0.389
(1.461) (−6.592) (−1.260) (−1.599)
ROA ± 0.005*** −0.005*** −0.000 −0.003**
(3.349) (−3.857) (−0.020) (−2.324)
Loans to Assets − −0.372*** 0.163 −0.021 0.151
(−3.376) (1.331) (−0.094) (1.501)
Deposits to Assets − 0.057 0.465*** −0.247 0.055
(0.445) (3.296) (−0.736) (0.487)
Noninterest to + −0.004 0.032*** 0.008 0.014***
Total Income (−0.887) (3.971) (1.292) (5.324)
bank-year obs. 5,690 5,690 5,690 5,690
distinct banks 965 965 965 965
countries 22 22 22 22
years 9 9 9 9
R2 within 2.67% 43.96% 17.71% 25.25%
This table presents the results of the regression analysis after excluding the period of the subprime crisis (i.e., years 2007–2009). All
variables are as defined in Appendix C. The model parameters are estimated using Fixed Effects estimation technique and the standard errors
are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered by bank. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. *, **, and
*** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively, all two-tailed.
Next, we test hypotheses 2 to 4. More specifically, we examine whether the change in the risk exposure after
the adoption of IFRS is more pronounced for banks operating in countries where accounting numbers are more
likely to be used for contracting purposes, for banks operating in countries with larger differences between local
accounting standards and IFRS, and for banks operating in countries that impose fewer restrictions on banks’
investment activities. We use the variables Burden of Proof and Reporting Quality to measure the propensity
of banks to use financial numbers in management compensation contracts (Lins et al. [2011]). We measure the
difference between local accounting standards and IFRS using the Absence and Divergence variables proposed
by Ding et al. [2007] and we measure the level of restrictions on banks’ investment activities using the variable
Investment Freedom proposed by Barth, Caprio and Levine [2008]. We split our sample in banks that operate
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in countries with above median values of the variable of interest and in banks that operate in countries with
below median values of the variable of interest (e.g., High Burden of Proof and Low Burden of Proof ), we run
subsample regressions, and we compare the coefficients of the IFRS dummies.
Table 2.8 presents the results of the subsample analysis. Panels A to D present the results of the analysis when we
split the sample by the variable Burden of Proof. In two out of four regressions, the increase in the risk exposure
is significantly higher for the subsample of banks operating in countries with below median values of Burden
of Proof, that is in countries where accounting numbers are more likely to be used in contracts. Panels E to H
present the results of the analysis when we split the sample by the variable Reporting Quality. The differences in
the coefficients of the IFRS dummies are statistically nonsignificant in all subsample regressions. Taken together,
the results in panels A to H provide only limited support to hypothesis 2 that the impact of IFRS adoption will
be more pronounced in countries where financial statement numbers are more likely to be used in management
compensation contracts.
Panels I to L present the results of the subsample analysis when we split the sample by the variable Absence.
The differences in the coefficients of the IFRS dummies are statistically nonsignificant in three out of four cases.
The difference in the IFRS coefficients is statistically different from zero only when we use Interest Exposure as
dependent. However, in contrast to our expectations, there is a statistically significant decrease in the interest rate
exposure for the subsample of banks with smaller differences between local accounting standards and IFRS. In
panels M to P, we split the sample by the variable Divergence. The differences in the coefficients are nonsignif-
icant in three out of four regressions. Moreover, the difference in the coefficient of the IFRS dummy in panel N
has the opposite sign of that expected; there is a statistically significant decrease in the interest rate risk exposure
in the subsample of banks operating in countries with larger differences between local accounting standards and
IFRS. Overall, the results of panels I to P do not lend support to hypothesis 3.
Finally, panels Q to T present the results of the subsample analysis when we split the sample by the degree of
banks’ investment freedom. The difference in the IFRS coefficients is statistically significant only in the case of
Interest Exposure. But opposite to what we expect, the difference in the coefficients is driven by a statistically
significant decrease in the interest rate exposure of banks with below median Investment Freedom. To summarize,
the evidence provided by the subsample analysis of table 2.8 lends limited support to the idea that the change in
the risk exposure of banks is more pronounced for the subsample of firms operating in countries where accounting
numbers are more likely to be used for contracting purposes. In addition, we find no evidence of larger changes
in the risk exposure for banks that operate in countries where local accounting standards differ more from IFRS
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and for banks that have to comply with fewer restrictions on their investment activities.
Table 2.8
Subsample Analysis
Panel A: Effect of IFRS on Equity Exposure
High Burden of Proof −
High Burden of Proof Low Burden of Proof Low Burden of Proof
IFRS coeff. 0.290*** 0.394*** −0.104*
t-stat. (10.243) (8.140) (p-value 0.094)
N 7,288 6,428
Panel B: Effect of IFRS on Interest Exposure
High Burden of Proof −
High Burden of Proof Low Burden of Proof Low Burden of Proof
IFRS coeff. −0.035 0.098** −0.133***
t-stat. (−1.419) (2.206) (p-value 0.001)
N 7,288 6,428
Panel C: Effect of IFRS on Exchange Exposure
High Burden of Proof −
High Burden of Proof Low Burden of Proof Low Burden of Proof
IFRS coeff. 0.650*** 0.863*** −0.213
t-stat. (10.771) (8.528) (p-value 0.164)
N 7,288 6,428
Panel D: Effect of IFRS on Commodity Exposure
High Burden of Proof −
High Burden of Proof Low Burden of Proof Low Burden of Proof
IFRS coeff. 0.039 0.008 0.031
t-stat. (1.303) (0.143) (p-value 0.439)
N 7,288 6,428
Panel E: Effect of IFRS on Equity Exposure
High Reporting Quality −
High Reporting Quality Low Reporting Quality Low Reporting Quality
IFRS coeff. 0.327*** 0.315*** 0.012
t-stat. (9.877) (9.304) (p-value 0.831)
N 6,917 6,799
Panel F: Effect of IFRS on Interest Exposure
High Reporting Quality −
High Reporting Quality Low Reporting Quality Low Reporting Quality
IFRS coeff. −0.010 −0.016 0.006
t-stat. (−0.342) (−0.526) (p-value 0.871)
N 6,917 6,799
Panel G: Effect of IFRS on Exchange Exposure
High Reporting Quality −
High Reporting Quality Low Reporting Quality Low Reporting Quality
IFRS coeff. 0.720*** 0.704*** 0.016
t-stat. (10.112) (10.027) (p-value 0.894)
N 6,917 6,799
Panel H: Effect of IFRS on Commodity Exposure
High Reporting Quality −
(Continued)
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Table 2.8 – Continued
High Reporting Quality Low Reporting Quality Low Reporting Quality
IFRS coeff. 0.024 0.041 −0.017
t-stat. (0.677) (1.115) (p-value 0.609)
N 6,917 6,799
Panel I: Effect of IFRS on Equity Exposure
High Absence −
High Absence Low Absence Low Absence
IFRS coeff. 0.325*** 0.299*** 0.026
t-stat. (9.948) (7.846) (p-value 0.648)
N 7,064 6,652
Panel J: Effect of IFRS on Interest Exposure
High Absence −
High Absence Low Absence Low Absence
IFRS coeff. 0.022 −0.069** 0.091**
t-stat. (0.799) (−2.012) (p-value 0.012)
N 7,064 6,652
Panel K: Effect of IFRS on Exchange Exposure
High Absence −
High Absence Low Absence Low Absence
IFRS coeff. 0.757*** 0.646*** 0.111
t-stat. (11.499) (8.167) (p-value 0.342)
N 7,064 6,652
Panel L: Effect of IFRS on Commodity Exposure
High Absence −
High Absence Low Absence Low Absence
IFRS coeff. 0.033 0.033 0.000
t-stat. (0.999) (0.798) (p-value 0.993)
N 7,064 6,652
Panel M: Effect of IFRS on Equity Exposure
High Divergence −
High Divergence Low Divergence Low Divergence
IFRS coeff. 0.282*** 0.366*** −0.084
t-stat. (8.837) (9.660) (p-value 0.120)
N 7,082 6,634
Panel N: Effect of IFRS on Interest Exposure
High Divergence −
High Divergence Low Divergence Low Divergence
IFRS coeff. −0.065** 0.054 −0.119***
t-stat. (−2.337) (1.562) (p-value 0.001)
N 7,082 6,634
Panel O: Effect of IFRS on Exchange Exposure
High Divergence −
High Divergence Low Divergence Low Divergence
IFRS coeff. 0.620*** 0.774*** −0.154
t-stat. (9.190) (9.698) (p-value 0.213)
N 7,082 6,634
Panel P: Effect of IFRS on Commodity Exposure
High Divergence −
High Divergence Low Divergence Low Divergence
(Continued)
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Table 2.8 – Continued
IFRS coeff. 0.039 0.007 0.032
t-stat. (1.138) (0.168) (p-value 0.356)
N 7,082 6,634
Panel Q: Effect of IFRS on Equity Exposure
High Investment Freedom −
High Investment Freedom Low Investment Freedom Low Investment Freedom
IFRS coeff. 0.269*** 0.356*** −0.087
t-stat. (8.876) (8.215) (p-value 0.167)
N 7,178 6,538
Panel R: Effect of IFRS on Interest Exposure
High Investment Freedom −
High Investment Freedom Low Investment Freedom Low Investment Freedom
IFRS coeff. −0.001 −0.075* 0.074**
t-stat. (−0.029) (−1.935) (p-value 0.015)
N 7,178 6,538
Panel S: Effect of IFRS on Exchange Exposure
High Investment Freedom −
High Investment Freedom Low Investment Freedom Low Investment Freedom
IFRS coeff. 0.675*** 0.699*** −0.024
t-stat. (10.310) (7.851) (p-value 0.846)
N 7,178 6,538
Panel T: Effect of IFRS on Commodity Exposure
High Investment Freedom −
High Investment Freedom Low Investment Freedom Low Investment Freedom
IFRS coeff. 0.049 0.009 0.040
t-stat. (1.507) (0.195) (p-value 0.229)
N 7,178 6,538
This table presents the results of the subsample analysis. We split the sample in banks with above median values of Burden of Proof, Reporting
Quality, Absence, Divergence, and Investment Freedom (High Burden of Proof, High Reporting Quality, High Absence, High Divergence,
and High Investment Freedom) and banks with below median values of Burden of Proof, Reporting Quality, Absence, Divergence, and
Investment Freedom (Low Burden of Proof, Low Reporting Quality, Low Absence, Low Divergence, and Low Investment Freedom), we run
subsample regressions, and compare the coefficients of the IFRS dummies. All variables are as defined in Appendix C. The model parameters
are estimated using Fixed Effects (FE) estimation technique and the standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered by bank.
The t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%,
respectively, all two-tailed.
2.6 Untabulated Robustness Tests
As robustness test, we examine the sensitivity of our results to the choice of variables used to measure monthly
changes in interest rates, exchange rates, and commodity prices. We alternatively measure interest rate changes
as the monthly changes in the one year LIBOR instead of the monthly changes in the overnight LIBOR. The
coefficient of the IFRS dummy is positive and significant at the 1% level (coefficient 0.278 and p-value 0.000).
Further, we use the European Central Bank exchange rate basket of a group of 12 trading partners as a proxy
for changes in exchange rates for European banks and the monthly percentage change in the Federal Reserve
Impact of IFRS on banks’ risk exposure 47
Bank of St. Louis trade-weighted dollar denominated exchange rate basket of a broad group of U.S. trading
partners for the case of U.S. banks. Our conclusions remain unchanged. The adoption of IFRS is associated with
a statistically significant increase in the exchange rate risk exposure of banks in our sample (coefficient 0.685
and p-value 0.000). We also measure the changes in commodity prices using the Economist instead of the Dow
Jones-UBS commodity index. The coefficient of the IFRS dummy is positive and statistically significant at the
1% level (coefficient 0.090 and p-value 0.000). Hence, our main conclusions are robust to alternative measures
of interest rate, exchange rate, and commodity exposure. All untabulated results are available upon request.
2.7 Conclusion
Our analysis shows an increase in the risk exposure of European banks after the mandatory adoption of IFRS in
2005. Our results are robust to the exclusion of the period of the subprime crisis. We provide limited support to
the hypothesis that the change in risk exposure is more pronounced in countries where accounting numbers are
more likely to be used for contracting purposes. We find no evidence of larger changes in risk exposure for the
subsample of banks operating in countries with larger differences between local accounting standards and IFRS
and for the subsample of banks with fewer restrictions on their investment activities. Our findings are in line with
theory that suggests that increased use of fair value accounting and increased disclosure requirements of hedging
activities can increase managerial risk taking and can induce suboptimal hedging (e.g., Burkhardt and Strausz
[2006]; DeMarzo and Duffie [1995]).
Our study adds to the literature by providing evidence on the real consequences of changes in accounting regula-
tions. In particular, our paper contributes to existing research by exploring the impact of changes in accounting
standards on a previously unexplored area, that is on banks’ investment and hedging decisions. We document
an increase in the risk exposure of banks. Nevertheless, the risks we are measuring are diversifiable. So, our
findings do not suggest that IFRS adoption is associated with an increase in the risk that investors have to bear.
There are a number of caveats related to our study. All European listed banks mandatorily report under IFRS
after 2005. So, controlling for concurrent effects that are unrelated to the adoption of IFRS is not a trivial task.
Further, we do not distinguish the impact of changes in hedge and fair value accounting rules on the risk exposure
of banks in our sample.
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Appendix C. Variables definition
Variable name Variable description
Returni monthly return of bank i
Returnm monthly return of value-weighted equity market portfolio
Interest monthly percentage change in overnight LIBOR
Exchange monthly percentage change in the European Central Bank
trade-weighted euro denominated exchange rate basket
Commodity monthly percentage change in the Dow Jones-UBS value-
weighted euro denominated commodity index
Equity Exposure absolute value of coefficient from regression of bank-specific
monthly returns on monthly returns of value-weighted equity
market portfolio
Interest Exposure absolute value of coefficient from regression of bank-specific
monthly returns on monthly percentage changes in overnight
LIBOR (Zhang [2009])
Exchange Exposure absolute value of coefficient from regression of bank-specific
monthly returns on monthly percentage changes in the
European Central Bank trade-weighted euro denominated
exchange rate basket (Zhang [2009])
Commodity Exposure absolute value of coefficient from regression of bank-specific
monthly returns on monthly percentage changes in the Dow
Jones-UBS value-weighted euro denominated commodity
index (Zhang [2009])
IFRS dummy that takes the value of 1 if the bank is reporting under
IFRS and zero otherwise
Return Volatility standard deviation of monthly returns over a year
Total Assets natural logarithm of total assets measured in U.S. dollars
Book to Market book value of equity to market value of equity
Financial Leverage total liabilities to total assets
ROA net income to total assets
Loans to Assets total loans to total assets
Deposits to Assets total deposits to total assets
Noninterest to Total Income non-interest income to net income
Burden of Proof country-specific index that measures the difficulty to prove
liability of accountants due to misleading financial statements
(La Porta et al. [2006])
Reporting Quality country-specific index that measures financial reporting
quality taken from CIFAR (Bushman et al. [2004])
Absence measure of the extent to which accounting rules regarding
specific topics are covered in IAS but are not covered in local
(Continued)
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Appendix C – Continued
Variable name Variable description
accounting standards (Ding et al. [2007]). This variable is
only applicable to banks that report under IFRS
Divergence measure of the extent to which accounting rules regarding
specific topics differ between IAS and local accounting
standards (Ding et al. [2007]). This variable is only
applicable to banks that report under IFRS
Investment Freedom measure of the regulatory restrictions imposed on banks
investment activities taken from Barth, Landsman and Lang [2008]
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Chapter 3
Aggregate Earnings and Corporate Bond
Markets∗
3.1 Introduction
Empirical literature shows that firm-specific earnings are positively related to firm-specific stock returns (e.g.,
Ball and Brown [1968]; Beaver [1968]) and positively related to firm-specific corporate bond returns (e.g., Datta
and Dhillon [1993]; Easton et al. [2009]). However, the earnings-returns relation at firm level differs consid-
erably from the earnings-returns relation at market level. Kothari et al. [2006] document a negative relation
between quarterly aggregate earnings changes and stock market returns and Cready and Gurun [2010] confirm
this negative relation using daily frequency data. Existing research on aggregate earnings focuses on the relation
between aggregate earnings changes and stock market returns. I extend this stream of literature by examining the
relation between aggregate earnings changes and corporate bond market returns.
This research question is important for various reasons. First, the information content of earnings is interesting
because earnings are the primary summary indicator of a firm’s performance and for this reason earnings are
used both for valuation and for contracting purposes. For example, analysts forecast earnings per share and they
use these forecasts to derive an estimate of the firm’s value and earnings are used in debt covenants and in man-
agement compensation contracts. Consequently, studying the information content of earnings and their relation
∗This chapter is based on Gkougkousi [2012]. I thank Dion Bongaerts, Renhui Fu, Gerard Mertens, Erik
Peek, Buhui Qiu, Gil Sadka, Rui Shen, Theodore Sougiannis, Manuel Vasconcelos, and the workshop partic-
ipants at Columbia Business School, Cornerstone Research, Erasmus School of Economics, ESSEC Business
School, EAA 28th Doctoral Colloquium, EAA 35th Annual Congress, HEC Paris, IESEG School of Manage-
ment, Rotterdam School of Management, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, University of Amsterdam, and Vrije
Universiteit for helpful comments.
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to capital markets has implications for managers, investors, and regulators. Second, academic literature provides
extensive evidence on the information content of firm-specific earnings. However, firm-specific earnings con-
tain different type of information than aggregate earnings; firm-specific earnings contain primarily information
about firm-specific cash flows while aggregate earnings contain primarily information about discount rates. Ag-
gregate earnings contain information about discount rates because aggregate earnings move together with the
macroeconomy. As a result, understanding the earnings-returns relation at firm level does not necessarily trans-
late to an understanding of the earnings-returns relation at market level. Third, corporate bonds are different
than stocks because corporate bonds have shorter maturities and predetermined and senior payments compared
to stocks. Subsequently, prior findings on the relation between aggregate earnings and stock market returns are
not generalizable to corporate bond markets. Fourth, the relation between aggregate earnings and market returns
is interesting over and above the relation between firm-specific earnings and firm-specific asset returns for well
diversified investors who invest in the market.
Aggregate earnings move together with cash flows (cash-flow effect) and with discount rates (discount-rate ef-
fect). Aggregate earnings changes are positively related to changes in cash flows because higher than expected
earnings provide good news about future cash flows. Nevertheless, the relation between aggregate earnings and
discount rates remains an open question. Sadka and Sadka [2009] argue that aggregate earnings are negatively
related to discount rates. In particular, they suggest that aggregate earnings are highly predictable. High expected
aggregate earnings reduce investors risk aversion and/or decrease risk, which ultimately reduces risk premia. As a
result, the negative contemporaneous aggregate earnings-returns relation is driven by a negative relation between
expected aggregate earnings changes and expected returns. Patatoukas and Yan [2011] suggest that aggregate
earnings are positively related to discount rates. More specifically, they argue that aggregate earnings contain
new information and they claim that the negative aggregate earnings-returns relation is driven by a positive rela-
tion between unexpected aggregate earnings changes and discount-rate news. Regardless of which of these two
streams of literature is correct, the fact remains that the cash-flow effect and the discount-rate effect of aggregate
earnings move asset prices in opposite directions.
In the case of stocks, the discount-rate effect dominates the cash-flow effect and the aggregate earnings-returns
relation is negative. But the relation between aggregate earnings and corporate bond market returns is not clear
a priori. On the one hand, payments to bondholders are predetermined and have priority over payments to other
stakeholders. Thus, the sensitivity of corporate bond market returns to cash-flow changes is low. On the other
hand, corporate bonds have shorter maturities than other claims on firm’s assets. Therefore, their sensitivity to
discount-rate changes is low. Taking the abovementioned into account, it is an empirical question whether the
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cash-flow effect or the discount-rate effect will be the dominant force in the relation between aggregate earnings
changes and corporate bond market returns.
I test this relation using a sample of quarterly observations from January 1973 to December 2010. I find that
aggregate earnings changes are negatively related to investment-grade corporate bond market returns and posi-
tively but nonsignificantly related to high-yield corporate bond market returns. My results are opposite to prior
firm-level findings of a positive relation between firm-specific earnings changes and firm-specific corporate bond
returns and are in line with prior market-level findings of a negative relation between aggregate earnings changes
and stock market returns. Further, my findings provide support to the theory that aggregate earnings move to-
gether with cash flows and with discount rates.
In addition, I test whether the relation between aggregate earnings changes and corporate bond market returns
depends on corporate bond credit ratings and corporate bond maturities. The impact of credit ratings on the
aggregate earnings-returns relation is not obvious ex-ante. On the one hand, it is possible that the aggregate
earnings-returns relation is lower for bonds with higher credit ratings. Low-rated bonds are more sensitive
to changes in cash flows than high-rated bonds (Easton et al. [2009]). Hence, the cash-flow effect of aggregate
earnings should be stronger for low-rated bonds. Further, literature suggests that aggregate earnings are positively
related to interest rates (Patatoukas and Yan [2011]). Interest rates are negatively related to credit spreads and this
negative relation is more pronounced for low-rated bonds (Duffee [1998]). The change in credit spreads dampens
the relation between aggregate earnings and discount rates and ultimately reduces the discount-rate effect of
aggregate earnings. Taking the aforementioned into account, the discount-rate effect of aggregate earnings should
be weaker for low-rated bonds. On the other hand, it is possible that the aggregate earnings-returns relation is
lower for bonds with lower credit ratings. The reason is that low-rated bonds are more sensitive to discount-
rate changes compared to high-rated bonds (Fama and French [1989]). Concerning the impact of bond maturity
on the aggregate earnings-returns relation, long-term bonds are by construction more sensitive to changes in
discount rates than short-term bonds. In addition, long-term bonds are less sensitive to changes in cash flows
compared to short-term bonds because cash-flow shocks are less persistent than discount-rate shocks (Campbell
[1991]). Therefore, I expect that the aggregate earnings-returns relation will be lower for long-term compared to
short-term bonds.
My analysis shows that there is indeed variation in the aggregate earnings-returns relation across bonds of dif-
ferent credit ratings and different maturities. In particular, I find that the relation between aggregate earnings
changes and bond market returns is lower for bonds with higher credit ratings and for bonds with longer matu-
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rities. Thus, corporate bond characteristics have an impact on the sensitivity of bonds to changes in cash flows
and to changes in discount rates. Prior literature shows that corporate bond credit ratings have an effect on the
earnings-returns relation at firm level. I find that both corporate bond credit ratings and corporate bond maturity
impact the earnings-returns relation at market level.
Then, I decompose aggregate earnings changes to aggregate accruals changes and aggregate cash-flow changes
and examine their relation to corporate bond market returns. Literature shows that the negative relation between
aggregate earnings changes and stock market returns is driven by the information contained in aggregate accruals
(Hirshleifer et al. [2009], Guo and Jiang [2011]).1 I test whether the same holds for the corporate bond markets.
To that end, first, I regress corporate bond market returns on aggregate accruals changes and then, I regress
corporate bond market returns on aggregate cash-flow changes. Surprisingly, I find that aggregate accruals have
limited explanatory power over corporate bond market returns. In contrast, aggregate cash flows are significantly
and negatively related to corporate bond market returns. These results demonstrate an interesting difference in
the pricing of information by the stock and corporate bond markets.
Next, I attempt to determine whether the relation between aggregate earnings changes and corporate bond market
returns is driven by the expected or the unexpected component of aggregate earnings. For this purpose, I perform
four sets of tests. First, I control for lagged aggregate earnings changes and lagged corporate bond market
returns in the regressions of corporate bond market returns on contemporaneous aggregate earnings changes. In
this way, I am more confident that the coefficient of aggregate earnings changes captures the relation between
unexpected aggregate earnings changes and bond market returns. My analysis shows that aggregate earnings
changes remain negatively and significantly related to investment-grade corporate bond market returns. Further,
aggregate earnings changes become positively and significantly related to high-yield corporate bond market
returns. Thus, it appears that the relation between aggregate earnings changes and market returns is not driven by
the expected but by the news component of aggregate earnings. Second, I examine the relation between aggregate
earnings changes and future corporate bond market returns. If aggregate earnings provide new information
about discount rates, then they must be positive predictors of corporate bond returns. I find that aggregate
earnings changes are for the most part unrelated to future bond returns. These results contradict the idea that
aggregate earnings contain new information and are in line with the theory put forward by Sadka and Sadka
[2009]. Third, I regress aggregate earnings changes on various proxies for discount-rates news and fourth, I
1Kang et al. [2010] show that aggregate discretionary accruals drive the negative relation between aggregate
total accruals and stock market returns. I focus my analysis on aggregate total accruals to circumvent issues
related to the measurement of aggregate discretionary accruals.
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test the relation between corporate bond market returns and aggregate earnings changes after controlling for
these discount-rate-news proxies. Aggregate earnings changes are negatively related to changes in term premia
and positively related to changes in expected inflation and to growth in industrial production. These results
uncover an important difference in the information content of firm-specific and market earnings. Firm-specific
earnings contain information about default risk (e.g., Callen et al. [2009]) while market earnings contain primarily
information about term premia and future inflation. Further, these results provide limited support to the idea that
aggregate earnings changes are positively related to discount-rate news. In addition, I find that aggregate earnings
changes do not lose their explanatory power over corporate bond market returns after controlling for the various
discount-rate-news proxies. These latter findings do not support the idea that aggregate earnings surprises are
positively related to discount-rate news. In summary, the four aforementioned sets of tests provide conflicting
evidence. Therefore, I cannot conclude whether it is the expected or the news component of aggregate earnings
that drives the relation between aggregate earnings changes and corporate bond market returns.
My study contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, my findings suggest that aggregate earnings
contain information both about cash flows and about discount rates. Prior literature documents that firm-specific
earnings contain mainly information about cash flows. Hence, my findings are important because they suggest
that aggregate earnings can provide different type of information to investors than firm-specific earnings. Second,
I show that corporate bond characteristics—and in particular corporate bond credit ratings and corporate bond
maturity—are important determinants of the earnings-returns relation at the aggregate level. Existing literature
shows that only corporate bond credit ratings impact the earnings-returns relation at firm level. Third, I provide
evidence of differential pricing of information by the stock and corporate bond markets. More specifically, I
show that the relation between aggregate accruals, aggregate cash flows, and corporate bond market returns is
different than the relation between aggregate accruals, aggregate cash flows, and stock market returns.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. I discuss the data in section 3.2. In section 3.3, I present
my empirical findings. I present the robustness tests in section 3.4 and in section 3.5, I conclude.
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3.2 Data and Summary Statistics
3.2.1 Sample Selection, Variables Description, and Empirical Methods
My sample consists of all firms with data available in Compustat North America Fundamentals Quarterly from
January 1973 to December 2010. I exclude firm-quarter observations with beginning of year market value of
equity below $1 million. I drop firms that are not listed in NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ to increase the compara-
bility of my results to previous studies. I exclude firms with fiscal year ends other than March, June, September,
and December to better align the aggregate earnings changes with the quarterly corporate bond market returns.
I drop firms with earnings announcement dates more than three months after the quarter end to exclude stale
earnings. I exclude the top and bottom 0.5% of firms ranked by earnings changes each quarter. My results are
qualitatively similar when I impose none of the aforementioned sample selection criteria.
I measure aggregate earnings changes (∆E/A) as the value-weighted average of firm-specific quarterly earnings
changes.2 I calculate firm-specific earnings changes as earnings in the current quarter minus earnings four quar-
ters ago scaled by lagged total assets. The scaling factor is lagged by four quarters. I measure earnings as income
before extraordinary items. These criteria and data requirements yield a sample of 360,614 firm-quarter observa-
tions. My results are qualitatively similar when I scale firm-specific earnings changes by lagged market value of
equity, lagged absolute earnings, lagged absolute book value of equity, and lagged enterprise value. My results
are also robust to calculating firm-specific earnings changes as the quarterly firm-specific analyst forecast errors.
Further, my main inferences are the same when I use operating income after depreciation instead of income
before extraordinary items as a measure of earnings.
To measure quarterly corporate bond market returns, I use the total returns of the value-weighted Bank of Amer-
ica Merrill Lynch U.S. Corporate Bond Indices downloaded from Bloomberg. Total return is the sum of price
return, accrued interest return, and coupon return. I use ten corporate bond indices with different maturities
and different credit ratings (R 1-3 AAA-AA, R 1-3 A-BBB, R 3-5 AAA-AA, R 3-5 A-BBB, R 5-10 AAA-AA, R 5-
10 A-BBB, R 15+ AAA-AA, R 15+ A-BBB, R all invest grade, R all high yield). The numbers in the names of
the corporate bond indices represent the remaining maturities of the bonds that comprise the indices and the letters
represent the credit ratings of the bonds that comprise the indices. The credit ratings are the average of the indi-
2The corporate bond indices used as dependents are value-weighted. Hence, I use value-weighted aggregate
earnings changes to better match the weighting of the dependent and independent variables. The results of my
analysis are the same, when I use equal-weighted aggregate earnings changes as independents.
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vidual bond ratings provided by Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch. R all invest grade and R all high yield
are indices comprising bonds of all available maturities that are investment-grade and high-yield, respectively.
The average number of issues populating the indices is 852 and each firm participates in each index with less
than two issues, on average. As a result, the corporate bond indices used in my analysis are well diversified.
The indices are rebalanced monthly, so the average remaining maturity and the average credit ratings of the
indices remain fairly stable through time. Further, the investment-grade (high-yield) corporate bonds included
in the indices have a minimum outstanding value equal to $250 ($100) million. Bond issuance size is positively
associated with bond liquidity (e.g., Hong and Warga [2000]). Hence, the corporate bond indices used in my
analysis include relatively liquid bond issues. In addition, zero returns occur less than 0.3% of the trading days
in my sample, which further suggests that bond illiquidity is not an issue.
I calculate aggregate accruals changes (∆Acc/A) as the value-weighted average of firm-specific accruals changes
and aggregate cash-flow changes (∆CF/A) as the value-weighted average of firm-specific cash-flow changes.
Firm-specific accruals change is the seasonally differenced quarterly accruals scaled by lagged total assets and
firm-specific cash-flow change is the seasonally differenced quarterly cash flows scaled by lagged total assets.
I measure firm-specific accruals using the indirect balance sheet method. Hence, accruals are defined as the
change in noncash current assets minus the change in current liabilities excluding the changes in short-term
debt minus depreciation and amortization. I measure firm-specific cash flows as the difference between income
before extraordinary items and accruals. I truncate the top and bottom 0.5% of firms ranked by firm-specific
accruals changes and firm-specific cash-flow changes each quarter. This leaves me with 210,879 firm-quarter
observations.
I use the following six proxies for discount-rate news. First, I use the ∆CP factor calculated as the quarterly
change in the fitted value from a regression of equal-weighted excess returns on bonds of two, three, four, and
five years maturities on a constant, the one-year yield, and the forward rates of two, three, four, and five years
(Cochrane and Piazzesi [2005]). Second, I use the variable ∆term calculated as the quarterly change in the
spread between the yield of a ten-year constant maturity Treasury note index and the yield of a one-year constant
maturity Treasury note index (Fama and French [1989]). Third, I use the variable ∆default calculated as the
quarterly change in the spread between the yield of a U.S. corporate bond index that includes corporate bonds
with maturities greater than ten years and the yield of a U.S. Treasury bond index that includes Treasury bonds
with maturities greater than ten years (Fama and French [1989]). Fourth, I use the variable ∆tbill measured as the
quarterly change in the yield of the three-month Treasury bill (Fama and French [1989]). Fifth, I use the variable
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∆exp infl calculated as the quarterly change in inflation expectations taken from the University of Michigan
Survey of Consumers (Fama and Schwert [1977]).3 And sixth, I use Gindpro measured as the quarterly growth
in industrial production. Industrial production growth is a leading indicator of macroeconomic activity and is
positively related to discount-rate news (Chen [1991]; Campbell and Mei [1993]). The changes in the discount-
rate proxies are measured from the end of quarter t−1 to the end of quarter t. I get the Fama-Bliss data of one
through five years discount bond prices used to calculate the ∆CP factor from CRSP. I retrieve data to calculate
∆term, ∆tbill, ∆exp infl, and Gindpro from the Federal Reserve Economic Data database of the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis. I retrieve the yields necessary to calculate the variable ∆default from Datastream.
For the estimation of my models, I use Ordinary Least Squares Regression (OLS) and Newey-West heteroscedas-
ticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. I set the bandwidth of the Bartlett kernel to the integer value
of 4×( T100 )
2
9 (Newey and West [1987]) where T is the number of observations used in the time-series regressions.
So, I use four lags in my estimations since the number of quarterly observations ranges from 91 to 152.
3.2.2 Summary Statistics
Table 3.1 reports summary statistics for all the variables of the regression models. The mean quarterly returns of
the various corporate bond indices range from 1.90% to 2.28%. As expected, bonds with longer maturities and
bonds with lower credit ratings have higher returns, on average. However, the differences in the means are not
statistically different from zero. The mean quarterly aggregate earnings change (∆E/A) is equal to 0.16% and is
similar to previous studies. Aggregate earnings changes exhibit significant time-series variation. Further, some
variables are persistent but the augmented Dickey-Fuller test rejects the null hypothesis of unit root for all the
variables at the 1% level.
Table 3.2 presents Spearman correlation coefficients between selected variables. The quarterly returns of the
various corporate bond indices are positively and significantly correlated at the 1% level. Thus, there is signif-
icant degree of commonality in the returns of the various corporate bond indices. Aggregate earnings changes
are negatively and significantly related to the returns of the corporate bond indices; the correlation coefficients
range from −0.29 to −0.42 and are significant at the 1% level. These correlations are in contrast to the posi-
3Alternatively, I could measure inflation expectations as the spread between the yield of a Treasury bond and
the yield of a Treasury Inflation Protected (TIP) security of the same maturity. However, yields of TIP securities
are only available from September 1997 and onwards. So, using TIPs would reduce significantly my sample size
and would decrease the power of my tests. For the same reason, I measure default premia using credit spreads
instead of credit default swap prices.
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Table 3.1
Summary Statistics
Mean Median St.Dev. Skew. Kurt. Autocorr. N
R 1-3 AAA-AA 1.90% 1.59% 1.96% 1.872 10.716 0.056 140
R 1-3 A-BBB 1.99% 1.78% 1.86% 1.143 9.259 0.190 140
R 3-5 AAA-AA 2.02% 1.84% 2.72% 1.190 8.645 −0.079 140
R 3-5 A-BBB 2.07% 1.93% 2.69% 1.062 7.741 0.069 135
R 5-10 AAA-AA 2.09% 1.78% 3.71% 0.616 5.308 −0.086 152
R 5-10 A-BBB 2.14% 1.82% 3.63% 0.678 5.856 0.066 152
R 15+ AAA-AA 2.23% 1.77% 5.45% 0.572 5.338 −0.128 152
R 15+ A-BBB 2.28% 1.97% 5.17% 0.534 5.572 −0.024 152
R all invest grade 2.09% 1.81% 4.10% 0.757 6.889 −0.004 152
R all high yield 2.26% 2.38% 4.90% 0.243 8.452 0.340 97
∆E/A 0.16% 0.22% 0.43% −1.591 9.673 0.684 152
∆Acc/A −0.17% −0.13% 0.58% −3.383 23.397 0.393 143
∆CF/A 0.32% 0.31% 0.64% 2.496 20.490 0.405 143
∆CP 0.00% −0.11% 1.67% 0.934 10.646 −0.253 152
∆term 0.01% −0.02% 0.68% 2.131 16.955 −0.164 152
∆default 0.01% −0.01% 0.29% −0.939 15.960 0.181 151
∆tbill −0.11% 0.00% 0.73% −2.974 18.605 0.138 115
∆exp infl −0.03% 0.00% 0.65% −1.189 6.151 −0.139 131
Gindpro 0.50% 0.74% 1.72% −1.638 7.576 0.465 152
This table presents summary statistics for the dependent and independent variables used in the regressions. All variables are as defined in
Appendix D. My sample extends from January 1973 to December 2010.
tive correlations between earnings changes and corporate bond returns at firm level (e.g., Easton et al. [2009])
and are in line with the negative correlations between earnings changes and stock returns at market level (e.g.,
Kothari et al. [2006]). Aggregate accruals changes (∆Acc/A) are uncorrelated with corporate bond market re-
turns and aggregate cash-flow changes (∆CF/A) are negatively and significantly correlated with corporate bond
market returns. These latter correlation coefficients are in contrast to previous findings of a significantly nega-
tive relation between aggregate accruals changes and stock market returns and a significantly positive relation
between aggregate cash-flow changes and stock market returns (Hirshleifer et al. [2009]). These coefficients
provide preliminary evidence of differential pricing of aggregate accruals and aggregate cash flows by the stock
and corporate bond markets.
Aggregate earnings changes are significantly correlated with three out of six discount-rate proxies. More specif-
ically, aggregate earnings changes are unrelated to changes in the Cochrane and Piazzesi [2005] factor (∆CP).
Further, aggregate earnings changes are negatively and significantly related to changes in term premia (∆term).
This correlation coefficient has the opposite sign of that expected assuming that aggregate earnings changes
are positively related to discount rates. Aggregate earnings changes are unrelated to changes in default premia
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(∆default). This result comes in contrast to prior findings of a strong negative relation between firm-specific
earnings and default risk (Callen et al. [2009]). In line with prior literature (Patatoukas and Yan [2011]), aggre-
gate earnings changes are positively and significantly related to changes in interest rates (∆tbill) and to industrial
production growth (Gindpro). Further, in contrast to prior findings (Shivakumar [2007]) aggregate earnings
changes are unrelated to changes in inflation expectations (∆exp infl). Taken as a whole, these findings provide
preliminary evidence that aggregate earnings move together with discount rates.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Corporate Bond Market Returns and Aggregate Earnings
In this section, I examine the relation between corporate bond market returns and contemporaneous aggregate
earnings changes. Table 3.3, panel A presents the results of the analysis. Aggregate earnings changes are
negatively and significantly related to the returns of the investment-grade corporate bond indices (Columns 1 to
9). Further, aggregate earnings changes are positively but nonsignificantly related to the returns of the high-yield
corporate bond index (Column 10).4 These results suggest that aggregate earnings move together with cash flows
and with discount rates. The discount-rate effect of aggregate earnings dominates the cash-flow effect in the case
of investment-grade corporate bond indices but the cash-flow effect swamps the discount-rate effect in the case
of the high-yield corporate bond index. Aggregate earnings changes explain between 0.6% and 5.7% of quarterly
corporate bond market returns. The low adjusted R2s are presumably due to the confounding impact of the cash-
flow effect and the discount-rate effect of aggregate earnings. The relation between aggregate earnings changes
and investment-grade corporate bond market returns is not only statistically but also economically significant;
a two-standard-deviation positive shock to aggregate earnings changes corresponds to a 0.7%–2.7% decrease in
investment-grade corporate bond market returns.
In table 3.3, panels B and C, I test whether the aggregate earnings-returns relation depends on corporate bond
characteristics. Table 3.3, panel B presents the differences in the coefficients of ∆E/A for pairs of bonds with the
same maturity but different credit ratings. All differences are negative but only the difference in the coefficients of
the last pair of bonds is statistically significant. The nonsignificant differences of the first four pairs are probably
4The results of my analysis are not sensitive to the exclusion of the period 2001–2003 (Jorgensen et al.
[2009]).
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because these pairs capture the differences in the coefficients of ∆E/A for investment-grade bonds while the last
pair captures the difference in the coefficients of ∆E/A for investment-grade versus high-yield bonds. The results
in panel B show that the aggregate earnings-returns relation is lower for high-rated compared to low-rated bonds.
These results provide support to the hypothesis that low-rated bonds are more sensitive to cash-flow changes than
high-rated bonds. These findings are also in line with the proposition that the discount-rate effect of aggregate
earnings is weaker for low-rated bonds because the dampening effect of credit spreads is more pronounced for
bonds with low credit ratings.
Table 3.3, panel C presents the differences in the coefficients of aggregate earnings changes for pairs of bonds
with the same credit rating but different maturities. The differences in the coefficients are, as expected, positive
and statistically different from zero at the 11% level or lower. Long-term bonds are more negatively related
to aggregate earnings changes than short-term bonds. These findings are in line with long-term bonds being
more sensitive to discount-rate changes and with short-term bonds being more sensitive to cash-flow changes. I
should note that the indices used in my analysis also include callable bonds that are at least one year from the
first call date. Even though call options are more common for long-term compared to short-term bonds (Kish
and Livingston [1992]), the results of table 3.3, panel C are not driven by differences in the optionality of the
corporate bond indices but by differences in corporate bond maturities. Embedded call options decrease the
sensitivity of corporate bond prices to interest rate changes. Therefore, the higher percentage of callable bonds
for long-term compared to short-term indices should decrease the discount-rate effect of aggregate earnings and
should ultimately have a positive impact on the aggregate earnings-returns relation.
To sum up, the findings in table 3.3, panels B and C provide evidence of variation in the aggregate earnings-
returns relation across different types of bonds. The aggregate earnings-returns relation is lower for bonds with
higher credit ratings and for bonds with longer maturities. These findings suggest that corporate bond charac-
teristics have an impact on the sensitivity of corporate bond prices to changes in cash flows and to changes in
discount rates. Prior literature finds that corporate bond credit ratings have an impact on the relation between
firm-specific earnings and firm-specific returns. I show that both corporate bond credit ratings and corporate
bond maturities matter at the aggregate level.
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3.3.2 Corporate Bond Market Returns, Aggregate Accruals, and Aggre-
gate Cash Flows
In this section, I decompose aggregate earnings changes to aggregate accruals changes (∆Acc/A) and aggregate
cash-flow changes (∆CF/A) and examine whether it is aggregate accruals or aggregate cash flows that drive the
negative aggregate earnings-returns relation. Table 3.4, panel A presents the results of the regressions of corporate
bond market returns on ∆Acc/A. All regression coefficients are statistically nonsignificant. Table 3.4, panel B
describes the results of the regressions when ∆CF/A is used as independent. Aggregate cash-flow changes are
negatively and significantly related to contemporaneous investment-grade corporate bond market returns. In
addition, aggregate cash-flow changes are positively related to high-yield corporate bond market returns but the
regression coefficient is not statistically different from zero. The results of table 3.4, panels A and B are in
contrast to prior literature that reports a negative relation between aggregate accruals changes and stock market
returns and a positive relation between aggregate cash-flow changes and stock market returns (Hirshleifer et al.
[2009]).5
Table 3.4, panel C presents the results of the regressions of corporate bond market returns on both components of
aggregate earnings. Aggregate accruals changes are weakly and negatively related to investment-grade corporate
bond market returns and aggregate cash-flow changes remain negatively and significantly related to investment-
grade corporate bond market returns. Thus, in the case of corporate bonds, it is the information in aggregate cash
flows that drives the negative aggregate earnings-returns relation. It is hard to reconcile my finding to those of
Hirshleifer et al. [2009]. In other words, it is hard to explain why aggregate accruals drive the relation between
aggregate earnings and stock market returns, while it is aggregate cash flows that drive the relation between
aggregate earnings and corporate bond market returns. This issue is worth further investigation.
5I am able to replicate the findings of Hirshleifer et al. [2009] using annual frequency data. The sample
extends from 1965 to 2005. I define aggregate accruals changes and aggregate cash-flow changes in the same
way as Hirshleifer et al. [2009]. I delete firms with other than December fiscal year end. I measure annual value-
weighted stock market returns using the NYSE/ AMEX/ NASDAQ index provided by CRSP. I measure annual
returns from December of year t−1 to December of year t. When the value-weighted stock market returns are
used as dependent, the coefficient of aggregate accruals changes is −1.213 with t-stat −2.08 and the coefficient
of aggregate cash-flow changes is 0.896 with t-stat 1.45. When the value-weighted corporate bond market returns
are used as dependent (i.e., R all invest grade), the coefficient of aggregate accruals changes is 0.520 with t-stat
2.44 and the coefficient of aggregate cash-flow changes is −1.018 with t-stat −3.00.
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3.3.3 Aggregate Earnings and Discount Rates
There is an ongoing debate in the literature regarding the relation between aggregate earnings and discount rates.
Sadka and Sadka [2009] argue that the negative relation between aggregate earnings and market returns is driven
by a negative relation between expected earnings and expected returns. More specifically, the authors suggest
that aggregate earnings are highly predictable. Assuming countercyclical risk premia, high expected aggregate
earnings changes result in low risk aversion and/or low risk and subsequently cause low expected returns. How-
ever, there are a number of papers that argue that the negative relation between aggregate earnings and returns is
driven by a positive relation between unexpected earnings and discount-rate news. Shivakumar [2007] suggests
that the negative aggregate earnings-returns relation is driven by a positive relation between aggregate earnings
surprises and inflation expectations and Patatoukas and Yan [2011] show that aggregate earnings surprises are
positively correlated with interest rates and with the implied equity risk premium.
I attempt to contribute to this debate. To that end, first I augment the regression of corporate bond market
returns on contemporaneous aggregate earnings changes by lagged aggregate earnings changes and by one, two,
three, four, and five quarters lagged corporate bond market returns. In this way, I try to control for the expected
component of aggregate earnings and I am more confident that the coefficient of ∆E/A captures new information.
Second, I examine whether aggregate earnings can predict returns. If aggregate earnings changes contain news
about discount rates, then they must be positive predictors of corporate bond market returns. To test this relation,
I regress one-quarter-forward corporate bond market returns on aggregate earnings changes. Third, I directly
examine the relation between aggregate earnings changes and discount rates by regressing aggregate earnings
changes on various proxies for discount-rate news. And fourth, I regress corporate bond market returns on
aggregate earnings changes after controlling for these discount-rate-news proxies.
Table 3.5 presents the results of the regressions of corporate bond market returns on contemporaneous aggregate
earnings changes, lagged aggregate earnings changes, and lagged corporate bond market returns. Aggregate earn-
ings changes remain negatively related to the returns of the investment-grade corporate bond indices (Columns 1
to 9). In addition, aggregate earnings changes become significantly positively related to contemporaneous high-
yield corporate bond market returns (Column 10). Hence, the aggregate earnings-returns relation persists even
after controlling for lagged aggregate earnings changes and lagged corporate bond market returns. This finding
suggests that it is the news component in aggregate earnings that drives the negative aggregate earnings-returns
relation.
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68 Chapter 3
Next, I test whether aggregate earnings changes can predict corporate bond market returns. If aggregate earn-
ings are positively related to discount-rate news, then they must be positively related to future corporate bond
market returns. Table 3.6, panel A presents the results of the regressions of one-quarter-forward corporate bond
market returns on aggregate earnings changes. All the coefficients of ∆E/A are negative and three out of ten are
marginally significant. One-quarter-forward returns are the corporate bond returns of the earnings announcement
quarter. Consequently, the negative aggregate earnings-returns relation of table 3.6, panel A can be due to the
release of information during the earnings announcement quarter. Thus, I also regress two, three, four, and five
quarters forward corporate bond market returns on aggregate earnings changes and the untabulated results are
similar; aggregate earnings changes are not positive predictors of corporate bond market returns.
In table 3.6, panel B, I augment the regressions of table 3.6, panel A by changes in inflation expectations,
lagged aggregate earnings changes, and lagged corporate bond market returns. In line with Patatoukas and Yan
[2011], I control for changes in expected inflation to mitigate the confounding effect of inflation expectations on
future returns. Sharpe [2002] reports a negative relation between expected inflation and future stock and bond
returns. It is possible that the negative relation between expected inflation and forward returns attenuates the
positive relation between aggregate earnings changes and forward returns. The analysis shows that the regression
coefficients of aggregate earnings changes remain statistically nonsignificant. One plausible explanation for the
negative and nonsignificant coefficients of ∆E/A in table 3.6 is that realized returns are a poor proxy for expected
returns. The reason is that cash-flow news and discount-rate news might not cancel out on average (Elton [1999]).
Nevertheless, the failure to find a positive relation between future returns and aggregate earnings changes casts
doubt to the idea that the aggregate earnings-returns relation is driven by a positive relation between unexpected
earnings and discount-rate news.
As a third set of tests, I directly examine the relation between aggregate earnings changes and a number of proxies
for discount-rate shocks. Table 3.7 presents the results of the regressions of aggregate earnings changes on
changes in the Cochrane and Piazzesi [2005] factor (∆CP), changes in term premia (∆term), changes in default
premia (∆default), changes in interest rates (∆tbill), changes in expected inflation (∆exp infl), and growth in
industrial production (Gindpro). Aggregate earnings changes are unrelated to changes in default premia. This
result differs from the firm-level findings of a negative relation between firm-specific earnings and default risk
(Callen et al. [2009]). Aggregate earnings changes are negatively and significantly related to changes in term
premia and positively and significantly related to changes in inflation expectations and to growth in industrial
production (Columns 2 and 3). The six proxies for discount-rate news explain 30.2% of aggregate earnings
changes. Taken as a whole, the findings of table 3.7 provide conflicting evidence regarding the relation between
Aggregate earnings and corporate bond markets 69
Ta
bl
e
3.
5
C
or
po
ra
te
B
on
d
R
et
ur
ns
,C
on
te
m
po
ra
ne
ou
s
an
d
La
gg
ed
E
ar
ni
ng
s
C
ha
ng
es
,a
nd
La
gg
ed
B
on
d
R
et
ur
ns
R
1-
3
R
1-
3
R
3-
5
R
3-
5
R
5-
10
R
5-
10
R
15
+
R
15
+
R
al
l
R
al
l
A
A
A
-A
A
t
A
-B
B
B
t
A
A
A
-A
A
t
A
-B
B
B
t
A
A
A
-A
A
t
A
-B
B
B
t
A
A
A
-A
A
t
A
-B
B
B
t
in
ve
st
gr
ad
e t
hi
gh
yi
el
d t
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0)
In
te
rc
ep
t
0.
01
4*
**
0.
01
4*
**
0.
02
0*
**
0.
01
9*
**
0.
02
4*
**
0.
02
3*
**
0.
02
6*
**
0.
02
6*
**
0.
02
3*
**
0.
01
9*
*
(3
.2
70
)
(3
.0
40
)
(4
.1
23
)
(3
.6
01
)
(4
.4
72
)
(4
.0
24
)
(4
.0
98
)
(3
.7
68
)
(4
.1
87
)
(2
.6
03
)
∆
E
/A
t
−1
.4
40
**
−0
.8
27
−2
.4
72
**
*
−1
.2
12
−3
.5
07
**
*
−1
.8
60
−6
.3
58
**
*
−3
.9
39
**
*
−2
.6
43
**
3.
79
5*
*
(−
2.
54
7)
(−
1.
31
0)
(−
3.
19
0)
(−
1.
18
6)
(−
3.
41
9)
(−
1.
51
3)
(−
3.
95
9)
(−
3.
28
4)
(−
2.
22
6)
(2
.2
67
)
∆
E
/A
t−
1
0.
71
8
−0
.0
07
1.
20
9*
0.
08
1
2.
24
1*
**
0.
46
4
4.
52
5*
**
1.
89
6
0.
99
6
−3
.6
90
*
(1
.4
50
)
(−
0.
01
1)
(1
.8
94
)
(0
.0
82
)
(2
.7
28
)
(0
.4
02
)
(3
.2
10
)
(1
.6
25
)
(0
.9
86
)
(−
1.
68
0)
R
t−
1
0.
02
4
0.
15
4
−0
.0
99
0.
04
7
−0
.0
77
0.
05
7
−0
.1
06
−0
.0
19
−0
.0
17
0.
45
4*
**
(0
.1
33
)
(0
.8
94
)
(−
0.
62
9)
(0
.2
77
)
(−
0.
66
6)
(0
.4
04
)
(−
1.
04
6)
(−
0.
16
5)
(−
0.
11
8)
(3
.5
72
)
R
t−
2
0.
02
1
0.
08
7*
0.
07
8
0.
08
1
0.
04
5
0.
06
1
0.
06
8
0.
11
0
0.
08
1
−0
.4
13
**
(0
.2
43
)
(1
.9
25
)
(0
.9
45
)
(1
.3
45
)
(0
.6
59
)
(1
.1
58
)
(0
.9
75
)
(1
.5
55
)
(1
.2
67
)
(−
2.
11
0)
R
t−
3
0.
13
9
0.
04
7
0.
11
0
0.
06
1
0.
08
9
0.
03
8
0.
10
0
0.
06
5
0.
07
3
0.
23
2*
*
(1
.5
65
)
(0
.4
08
)
(1
.3
27
)
(0
.6
98
)
(1
.1
91
)
(0
.4
67
)
(1
.3
85
)
(0
.9
10
)
(0
.9
37
)
(2
.3
65
)
R
t−
4
0.
09
2
0.
01
1
0.
06
6
−0
.0
08
0.
03
8
−0
.0
24
0.
06
6
0.
00
1
0.
01
5
−0
.1
28
(1
.3
30
)
(0
.1
74
)
(0
.7
91
)
(−
0.
09
2)
(0
.4
98
)
(−
0.
28
7)
(0
.7
94
)
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.1
74
)
(−
1.
22
4)
R
t−
5
0.
02
1
0.
06
0
−0
.0
74
−0
.0
30
−0
.1
07
−0
.0
79
−0
.1
46
−0
.1
30
−0
.1
28
0.
02
4
(0
.2
46
)
(0
.6
77
)
(−
0.
66
3)
(−
0.
30
9)
(−
1.
15
5)
(−
0.
90
9)
(−
1.
61
1)
(−
1.
51
5)
(−
1.
36
9)
(0
.3
23
)
N
13
5
13
5
13
5
13
0
14
7
14
7
14
7
14
7
14
7
92
A
dj
.R
2
5.
63
%
3.
99
%
6.
68
%
−0
.5
5%
6.
06
%
−0
.1
3%
12
.2
0%
3.
65
%
2.
28
%
22
.5
1%
T
hi
s
ta
bl
e
pr
es
en
ts
th
e
re
su
lts
of
th
e
re
gr
es
si
on
s
of
th
e
re
tu
rn
s
of
va
ri
ou
s
co
rp
or
at
e
bo
nd
in
di
ce
s
on
co
nt
em
po
ra
ne
ou
s
an
d
la
gg
ed
ag
gr
eg
at
e
ea
rn
in
gs
ch
an
ge
s
an
d
la
gg
ed
co
rp
or
at
e
bo
nd
m
ar
ke
t
re
tu
rn
s.
A
ll
va
ri
ab
le
s
ar
e
as
de
fin
ed
in
A
pp
en
di
x
D
.R
t−
1
,R
t−
2
,R
t−
3
,R
t−
4
,a
nd
R
t−
5
ar
e
th
e
la
gg
ed
by
on
e,
tw
o,
th
re
e,
fo
ur
,a
nd
fiv
e
qu
ar
te
rs
de
pe
nd
en
ts
of
ea
ch
m
od
el
,r
es
pe
ct
iv
el
y.
M
y
sa
m
pl
e
ex
te
nd
s
fr
om
Ja
nu
ar
y
19
73
to
D
ec
em
be
r
20
10
.
I
us
e
O
rd
in
ar
y
L
ea
st
Sq
ua
re
s
fo
r
th
e
ca
lc
ul
at
io
n
of
th
e
re
gr
es
si
on
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
s
an
d
N
ew
ey
-W
es
th
et
er
os
ce
da
st
ic
ity
an
d
au
to
co
rr
el
at
io
n
co
ns
is
te
nt
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
.T
he
t-
st
at
is
tic
s
ar
e
re
po
rt
ed
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s
be
lo
w
th
e
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
es
tim
at
es
.*
**
,*
*,
an
d
*
de
no
te
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
at
th
e
1%
,5
%
,a
nd
10
%
le
ve
ls
,r
es
pe
ct
iv
el
y.
70 Chapter 3
aggregate earnings changes and discount-rate news.
I also test whether the relation between corporate bond market returns and contemporaneous aggregate earnings
changes persists after controlling for the six aforementioned discount-rate proxies. As table 3.8 shows, all but
one of the coefficients of ∆E/A decrease in absolute magnitude. However, the decrease in the coefficients is not
statistically different from zero. Aggregate earnings changes and the proxies for discount rates explain between
43.9% and 66.2% of corporate bond market returns. The fact that the relation between aggregate earnings and
corporate bond market returns persists even after controlling for the discount-rate news proxies casts doubt to
the idea that aggregate earnings changes are negatively related to corporate bond market returns because they are
positively related to discount-rate news.
Overall, the results of tables 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8 provide conflicting evidence. On the one hand, aggregate earn-
ings changes are related to corporate bond market returns even after controlling for lagged aggregate earnings
changes and lagged corporate bond market returns. Moreover, aggregate earnings changes correlate positively
with changes in expected inflation and with growth in industrial production. These results support the hypothesis
that aggregate earnings are unpredictable and suggest that aggregate earnings surprises are positively related to
discount-rate news. On the other hand, aggregate earnings changes do not have predictive power over corpo-
rate bond market returns, aggregate earnings changes are negatively related to changes in term premia, and the
negative aggregate earnings-returns relation persists even after controlling for the various discount-rate shocks
proxies. And these results call into question the idea that aggregate earnings surprises are positively related to
discount-rate news. Therefore, my findings do not allow me to conclude whether it is the expected or the unex-
pected component of aggregate earnings that drives the negative aggregate earnings-returns relation for corporate
bonds.
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Table 3.7
Aggregate Earnings Changes and Discount-Rate Proxies
∆E/At ∆E/At ∆E/At
(1) (2) (3)
Intercept 0.001** 0.001** 0.001
(2.194) (2.265) (0.876)
∆CPt 0.016 0.007 0.017
(0.703) (0.336) (0.952)
∆termt −0.271 −0.359* −0.272*
(−1.445) (−1.860) (−1.891)
∆defaultt −0.024 −0.003 0.119
(−0.186) (−0.024) (0.840)
∆tbillt 0.117 0.067 0.014
(1.317) (0.825) (0.230)
∆exp inflt 0.221** 0.188**
(2.459) (2.403)
Gindprot 0.119***
(3.455)
N 115 115 115
Adj. R2 11.98% 18.34% 30.17%
This table presents the results of the regressions of aggregate earnings changes on various proxies for discount-rate news. All variables are
as defined in Appendix D. My sample extends from January 1973 to December 2010. I use Ordinary Least Squares for the calculation of
the regression coefficients and Newey-West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. The t-statistics are reported in
parentheses below the coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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3.4 Robustness Tests
My main inferences are the same when I measure corporate bond market returns using the Barclays Capital
U.S. Corporate Bond Indices downloaded from Datastream and when I use quarterly changes in the yields to
maturity instead of quarterly total returns as dependent. My results are also qualitatively similar when I scale
firm-specific earnings changes by lagged market value of equity, lagged absolute earnings, lagged absolute book
value of equity, and lagged enterprise value instead of lagged total assets. Enterprise value is the sum of market
value of equity plus book value of debt. My findings are robust to measuring aggregate earnings changes as
the equal-weighted average of firm-specific earnings changes instead of the value-weighted average and they
are robust to measuring earnings as operating income after depreciation instead of earnings before extraordinary
items. In addition, my main inferences remain unchanged when I measure firm-specific earnings changes as the
firm-specific analyst forecast errors. I measure analyst forecast errors as reported earnings minus the median
of analysts’ earnings forecasts announced at the end of the previous quarter. I download analyst forecasts from
IBES. Further, my findings are not sensitive to any of the sample selection criteria imposed and they are not
sensitive to the use of annual and daily instead of quarterly frequency data. For brevity purposes, I only present
the results of the robustness tests when I use daily and annual instead of quarterly frequency data. All other
untabulated tests are available upon request.
Following Cready and Gurun [2010], I use daily frequency data to ensure that the relation between aggregate
earnings changes and corporate bond market returns does not merely reflect an association between aggregate
earnings changes and other macroeconomic variables. The daily sample extends from November 3, 1986 to
December 31, 2010. I define daily aggregate earnings changes as the value-weighted average of firm-specific
earnings changes. I measure firm-specific earnings changes as earnings in the current quarter minus earnings four
quarters ago scaled by lagged total assets. I only keep observations with more than seven earnings announcements
per day to ensure that the idiosyncratic component of earnings is diversified away.
Table 3.9, panel A reports the results of the regressions. The relation between daily investment-grade corporate
bond market returns and aggregate earnings changes is negative and statistically significant in seven out of nine
regressions (Columns 1 to 9). In addition, the relation between high-yield corporate bond market returns and
aggregate earnings changes is positive but statistically nonsignificant (Column 10). The nonsignificant regression
coefficients in the case of the long-term corporate bond indices (i.e., R 15+ AAA-AA and R 15+ A-BBB) are most
likely due to the high illiquidity of these indices. Less liquid bonds trade less frequently, incorporate information
at a slower pace, and thus have a weaker relation to aggregate earnings changes.
76 Chapter 3
Table 3.9, panel B presents the results of the regressions when I use annual frequency data. The annual sample
period extends from 1973 to 2010. The results are similar to the findings using quarterly observations. Aggregate
earnings changes are negatively related to investment-grade corporate bond market returns and positively but
nonsignificantly related to high-yield corporate bond market returns. Moreover, this relation is lower for bonds
with higher credit ratings and for bonds with longer maturities.
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3.5 Conclusion
I examine the relation between aggregate earnings changes and corporate bond market returns. I find that aggre-
gate earnings changes are significantly negatively related to investment-grade corporate bond market returns and
positively but nonsignificantly related to high-yield corporate bond market returns. My findings are in line with
the idea that aggregate earnings move together with cash flows and with discount rates. The relation between
aggregate earnings changes and market returns is lower for bonds with higher credit ratings and for bonds with
longer maturities. Hence, corporate bond credit ratings and corporate bond maturities affect the sensitivity of
corporate bond prices to cash-flow changes and to discount-rate changes. Previous literature shows that aggre-
gate accruals drive the negative relation between aggregate earnings and stock market returns. Surprisingly, I
find that in the case of corporate bonds, it is primarily the information in aggregate cash flows that drives the
negative aggregate earnings-returns relation.
My findings have several implications. First, I show that the relation between earnings and corporate bond returns
is different at market level compared to firm level. Firm-specific corporate bond returns are positively related to
firm-specific earnings while corporate bond market returns are negatively related to market earnings. Second,
prior literature shows that credit ratings have an impact on the earnings-returns relation at firm level. I show
that both corporate bond credit ratings and corporate bond maturity matter at the aggregate level. Third, while
firm-specific earnings contain information about default risk, aggregate earnings provide information about term
premia and about future inflation. Finally, I uncover an interesting difference in the pricing of aggregate accruals
and aggregate cash flows by the stock and corporate bond markets. This latter finding provides a fruitful avenue
for future research.
My findings do not provide evidence on whether the aggregate earnings contain new information. My results
merely suggest that aggregate earnings move together with cash flows and with discount rates. Future research
should focus on isolating the news component of aggregate earnings and examining its relation to asset returns.
This task is not trivial given that expectation models for aggregate earnings are not well developed. Another
interesting avenue for future research is to examine whether aggregate earnings provide more or less timely and
accurate information about future macroeconomic conditions than other macroeconomic variables, for example,
gross domestic product or industrial production growth.
All in all, aggregate earnings are an overlooked and potentially invaluable source of information that merits
further investigation.
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Appendix D. Variables definition
Variable name Variable description
R 1-3 AAA-AA quarterly total returns of U.S. corporate bond index that includes bonds with
remaining maturities between 1 and 3 years and with credit ratings between
AAA and AA
R 1-3 A-BBB quarterly total returns of U.S. corporate bond index that includes bonds with
remaining maturities between 1 and 3 years and with credit ratings between A
and BBB
R 3-5 AAA-AA quarterly total returns of U.S. corporate bond index that includes bonds with
remaining maturities between 3 and 5 years and with credit ratings between
AAA and AA
R 3-5 A-BBB quarterly total returns of U.S. corporate bond index that includes bonds with
remaining maturities between 3 and 5 years and with credit ratings between A
and BBB
R 5-10 AAA-AA quarterly total returns of U.S. corporate bond index that includes bonds with
remaining maturities between 5 and 10 years and with credit ratings between
AAA and AA
R 5-10 A-BBB quarterly total returns of U.S. corporate bond index that includes bonds with
remaining maturities between 5 and 10 years and with credit ratings between
A and BBB
R 15+ AAA-AA quarterly total returns of U.S. corporate bond index that includes bonds with
remaining maturities over 15 years and with credit ratings between AAA and
AA
R 15+ A-BBB quarterly total returns of U.S. corporate bond index that includes bonds with
remaining maturities over 15 years and with credit ratings between A and BBB
R all invest grade quarterly total returns of U.S. corporate bond index that includes investment-
grade bonds of all available maturities
R all high yield quarterly total returns of U.S. corporate bond index that includes high-yield
bonds of all available maturities
∆E/A quarterly aggregate earnings changes measured as the value-weighted average
of firm-specific earnings changes. Firm-specific earnings change is the sea-
sonally differenced income before extraordinary items scaled by lagged total
assets
∆Acc/A quarterly aggregate accruals changes measured as the value-weighted average
of firm-specific accruals changes. Firm-specific accruals change is the season-
ally differenced accruals scaled by lagged total assets. Accruals is the change
in noncash current assets minus the change in current liabilities excluding the
changes in short-term debt minus depreciation and amortization
(Continued)
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Appendix D – Continued
Variable name Variable description
∆CF/A quarterly aggregate cash-flow changes measured as the value-weighted aver-
age of firm-specific cash-flow changes. Firm-specific cash-flow change is the
seasonally differenced cash flows scaled by lagged total assets. Cash flows is
the difference between income before extraordinary items and accruals
∆CP change in the Cochrane and Piazzesi [2005] factor measured as the change
in the fitted value from a regression of equal-weighted excess returns of two,
three, four, and five years bonds on a constant, the one-year yield, and the
forward rates of two, three, four, and five years
∆term change in the spread between the yield of a ten-year constant maturity Treasury
note index and the yield of a one-year constant maturity Treasury note index
∆default change in the spread between the yield of a U.S. corporate bond index that
includes bonds with maturities greater than ten years and the yield of a U.S.
Treasury bond index that includes bonds with maturities greater than ten years
∆tbill change in the yield of the three-month Treasury bill
∆exp infl change in the University of Michigan Survey of Consumers inflation expecta-
tions
Gindpro seasonally adjusted growth in industrial production
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Summary in English
The three chapters of this thesis belong to the area of capital markets research in accounting. Chapter 1 and chap-
ter 2 examine the real consequences of changes in accounting regulation. Chapter 3 focuses on the information
content of earnings and in particular on the information content of aggregate earnings.
Chapter 1 examines the effect of mandatory International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption on the
cost of equity and liquidity of European banks. This study is motivated by the ongoing debate on the benefits
and costs of the new accounting standards particularly for banks. On the one hand, IFRS has increased the
disclosure requirements and has enhanced the comparability of financial statements across firms in different
countries. Increased disclosure requirements and increased comparability of financial statements can increase
market liquidity and decrease a firm’s cost of equity due to lower information asymmetry between a firm and its
investors. On the other hand, there is an increase in the use of fair value accounting as a result of the adoption
of IFRS. Fair value accounting is associated with increased earnings’ volatility, higher procyclicality of financial
institutions, and excessive managerial risk-taking and thus with higher cost of equity. Hence, the economic
consequences of IFRS on banks are an empirical question. To answer this question, we use a sample of European
banks for the period 2002–2007. Our analysis shows a statistically and economically significant decrease in the
cost of equity of banks after the adoption of IFRS. These results are in line with the theory that suggests that
increased disclosure requirements and increased comparability of financial statements can have capital market
benefits for adopting firms. We find no evidence of lower capital market benefits for banks with large increases
in the exposure to fair value accounting as a result of IFRS. These latter findings do not support the concerns of
academics and practitioners that fair value accounting can be suboptimal for banks. Further, the decrease in cost
of equity is more pronounced for banks with low pre-adoption quality of information environment. Regarding
liquidity, the results are sensitive to the proxy used.
In chapter 2, we examine the impact of mandatory IFRS adoption on the risk exposure of banks in Europe. We
use a sample of European banks for the period 1999–2010 and we measure risk exposure as the exposure of banks
to equity, interest rate, exchange rate, and commodity risk. Our results show an increase in the risk exposure of
banks after the mandatory adoption of IFRS in 2005. These findings provide support to the theory that increased
disclosure requirements for hedging activities and increased use of fair value accounting can induce suboptimal
hedging of banks’ risks and can encourage excessive managerial risk taking. We also provide limited evidence
that the increase in risk exposure is more pronounced for banks operating in countries where accounting numbers
are more likely to be used for contracting purposes.
Chapter 3 examines the relation between aggregate earnings changes and corporate bond market returns. Ag-
gregate earnings are interesting because they provide different type of information than firm-specific earnings;
firm-specific earnings contain primarily information about cash flows while aggregate earnings contain primar-
ily information about discount rates. In addition, the relation between aggregate earnings and market returns
is interesting over and above the relation between firm-specific earnings and firm-specific returns because well-
diversified investors invest in the market portfolio. I use a sample of quarterly observations from 1973 to 2010
and I show that aggregate earnings changes are negatively and significantly related to investment-grade corporate
bond market returns and positively but nonsignificantly related to high-yield corporate bond market returns. My
results suggest that the discount-rate effect of aggregate earnings dominates the cash-flow effect for investment-
grade corporate bonds and so the earnings-returns relation is negative. But the cash-flow effect of aggregate
earnings swamps the discount-rate effect for high-yield corporate bonds and the earnings-returns relation is posi-
tive but statistically nonsignificant. The aggregate earnings-returns relation is lower for high-rated and long-term
bonds. Hence, the sensitivity of corporate bonds to cash-flow changes and to discount-rate changes depends
on corporate bond maturities and corporate bond credit ratings. I also find that the relation between aggregate
earnings changes and corporate bond market returns is mainly driven by the information contained in aggregate
cash flows. Prior literature shows that the negative earnings-returns relation for stocks is driven by aggregate
accruals. This latter finding provides evidence of differential pricing of information by the corporate bond and
stock markets.
The results of chapter 1 and chapter 2 suggest that changes in accounting standards can have economic con-
sequences for adopting firms. These findings have standard setting implications and contribute to the ongoing
debate on the global convergence of accounting standards. Chapter 3 highlights the difference in the information
content of aggregate earnings compared to firm-specific earnings and provides evidence of value-relevance of
aggregate earnings for well-diversified investors.
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Summary in Dutch
De drie hoofdstukken in deze dissertatie behoren tot het veld van kapitaalmarktonderzoek in accounting. Hoofd-
stuk 1 en hoofdstuk 2 onderzoeken de werkelijke consequenties van veranderingen in accountingregels. Hoofd-
stuk 3 richt zich op het informatiegehalte van winst en in het bijzonder op het informatiegehalte van geag-
gregeerde winst.
Hoofdstuk 1 onderzoekt het effect van verplichte adoptie van International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)
op de kosten van eigen vermogen en de liquiditeit van Europese banken. Dit onderzoek wordt gemotiveerd door
het lopende debat over de voor- en nadelen van de nieuwe accountingstandaard, in het bijzonder voor banken.
Aan de ene kant heeft IFRS de informatieverplichtingen verhoogd en de vergelijkbaarheid van de financile ver-
slaggeving van bedrijven uit verschillende landen verbeterd. Hogere informatieverplichtingen en betere vergeli-
jkbaarheid van financile verslaggeving kunnen de liquiditeit van de markt verhogen en de kosten van eigen
vermogen verlagen door een afname van informatie-asymmetrie tussen de onderneming en de investeerder. Aan
de andere kant is er als gevolg van de adoptie van IFRS een toename in het gebruik van fair value accounting. Fair
value accounting wordt geassocieerd met een verhoogde winstvolatiliteit, een hogere procycliciteit van financile
instellingen, en het overmatig nemen van bestuurlijke risico’s en dus met hogere kosten van het eigen vermogen.
Vandaar zijn de economische gevolgen van IFRS op de banken een empirische vraag. Om deze vraag te beant-
woorden maken we gebruik van een steekproef van Europese banken in de periode 2002–2007. Onze analyse
toont een statistisch en economisch significante afname van de kosten van het eigen vermogen van de banken na
de invoering van IFRS. Deze resultaten zijn in lijn met de theorie die suggereert dat versterking van de openbaar-
makingsverplichtingen en een verhoogde vergelijkbaarheid van de jaarrekeningen kapitaalmarktvoordelen kan
hebben voor de adopterende bedrijven. We vinden geen bewijs van lagere kapitaalmarktvoordelen voor banken
met grote toename in de blootstelling aan fair value accounting als gevolg van IFRS. Deze laatste bevindingen
bieden geen ondersteuning voor de zorgen van academici en praktijkmensen dat fair value accounting subopti-
maal kan zijn voor banken. Verder is de daling van de kosten van het eigen vermogen meer uitgesproken voor
banken met een lage pre-adoptie kwaliteit van de informatie-omgeving. Met betrekking tot liquiditeit zijn de
resultaten gevoelig voor de gebruikte proxy.
In hoofdstuk 2 onderzoeken we de invloed van verplichte adoptie van IFRS op de risicoblootstelling van banken
in Europa. We maken gebruik van een steekproef van Europese banken voor de periode 1999–2010 en we meten
risicoblootstelling als de blootstelling van banken aan markt-, rente-, wisselkoers- en grondstoffenrisico’s. Onze
resultaten tonen een toename in de risicoblootstelling van banken na de verplichte adoptie van IFRS in 2005.
Deze bevindingen ondersteunen de theorie dat verhoogde informatieverplichtingen van hedging-activiteiten en
meer gebruik van fair value accounting kan leiden tot suboptimale afdekking van de risico’s van banken en
kunnen aansporen tot het overmatig nemen van risico. We bieden ook beperkt bewijs dat de toename van risi-
coblootstelling meer uitgesproken is voor banken die actief zijn in landen waar de boekhoudcijfers vaker worden
gebruikt bij het sluiten van contracten.
Hoofdstuk 3 gaat in op de relatie tussen veranderingen in geaggregeerde winst en rendement in de markt voor
bedrijfsobligaties. Geaggregeerde inkomsten zijn interessant omdat ze ander soort informatie bevatten dan bedri-
jfsspecifieke winsten; bedrijfsspecifieke winsten bevatten in de eerste plaats informatie over de kasstromen, ter-
wijl de winst in de markt in de eerste plaats informatie bevat over verdisconteringsvoeten. De relatie tussen
markt-inkomsten en marktrendement is meer interessant dan de relatie tussen bedrijfsspecifieke winsten en bedri-
jfsspecifiek rendement, omdat goed gediversifieerde beleggers investeren in de marktportefeuille. Ik gebruik een
steekproef van waarnemingen per kwartaal tussen 1973 en 2010 en ik laat zien dat de geaggregeerde winstveran-
deringen negatief en significant gerelateerd zijn aan het marktrendement van investment-grade bedrijfsobligaties
en positief maar niet significant gerelateerd aan het marktrendement van high-yield bedrijfsobligaties. Mijn
resultaten suggereren dat het verdisconteringsvoet-effect van de geaggregeerde inkomsten het kasstroomeffect
voor investment-grade bedrijfsobligaties domineert en dus de winst-rendement-verhouding negatief is. Maar het
kasstroomeffect van de geaggregeerde winst overheerst het verdisconteringsvoet-effect voor high-yield bedrijf-
sobligaties en de winst-rendement-relatie is positief, maar niet significant. De totale winst-rendement-verhouding
is lager voor obligaties met hoge rating en van lange termijn. Vandaar dat de gevoeligheid van bedrijfsobligaties
voor kasstroomveranderingen en veranderingen in de verdisconteringsvoet afhangt van rating en termijn. Ik
toon ook aan dat de relatie tussen de geaggregeerde winstveranderingen en marktrendement op bedrijfsobligaties
voornamelijk wordt gedreven door de informatie in de totale kasstromen. De bestaande literatuur laat zien dat de
negatieve winst-rendement-verhouding voor aandelen wordt gedreven door geaggregeerde accruals. Bijgevolg
levert deze laatste bevinding het bewijs van differentile prijsstelling van informatie door de bedrijfsobligatie- en
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aandelenmarkten.
De resultaten van hoofdstuk 1 en hoofdstuk 2 suggereren dat veranderingen in de standaarden voor accounting
economische gevolgen kunnen hebben voor bedrijven. Mijn bevindingen hebben implicaties voor het stellen
van standaarden en dragen bij aan het voortdurende debat over de wereldwijde convergentie van standaarden
voor accounting. Hoofdstuk 3 benadrukt het verschil in de informatie-inhoud van geaggregeerde marktwinst
in vergelijking met bedrijfsspecifieke winsten en levert het bewijs van de waarde-relevantie van geaggregeerde
inkomsten voor goed gediversifieerde beleggers.

93
Summary in Greek
Ta trÐa keflaia ths paroÔs diatrib s an koun o pedÐo ths èreunas kefalaiogor¸n h logiik .
Ta keflaia 1 kai 2 exetzoun tis epipt¸is twn allag¸n h logiik  nomojeÓa. To keflaio 3
epikentr¸netai o plhroforiakì perieqìmeno twn logiik¸n kerd¸n kai pio gkekrimèna o plhro-
foriakì perieqìmeno twn nolik¸n logiik¸n kerd¸n.
To keflaio 1 exetzei tis epipt¸is ths upoqrewtik s uiojèths twn Diejn¸n Logiik¸n ProtÔpwn
(DLP) o kìos kefalaÐou kai h reuìthta twn Eurwpaðk¸n trapez¸n. H melèth aut  èqei n
ènaua thn trèqou z th etik me ta wfèlh kai kìh twn nèwn logiik¸n protÔpwn g-
kekrimèna gia tis trpezes. Apì th mia pleur, ta DLP epiblloun th gnwopoÐh megalÔterou ìgkou
plhrofori¸n kai èqoun eniÔi th gkri	mìthta twn oikonomik¸n katawn metaxÔ epiqeir -
wn  diaforetikès q¸res. O auxhmènos ìgkos plhrofori¸n kai h eniumènh gkri	mìthta twn
oikonomik¸n katawn mporoÔn na aux un th reuìthta hn agor kai na mei¸un to kìos
kefalaÐou, exaitÐas ths meiwmènhs ammetrÐas plhrofìrhs metaxÔ ths epiqeÐrhs kai twn ependut¸n.
Apì thn llh pleur, parathreÐtai auxhmènh qr  ths eÔloghs logiik  axÐas ws apotèlea ths uio-
jèths twn DLP. H qr  ths eÔloghs logiik s axÐas èqei ndejeÐ me auxhmènh metablhtìthta
twn kajar¸n kerd¸n, auxhmènh prokuklikìthta twn qrhmatopiwtik¸n idrumtwn, kai auxhmènh l yh
rÐwn apì ta trapezik elèqh kai, kat nèpeia, me uyhlìtero kìos kefalaÐou. Ws ek toÔtou, oi
oikonomikès nèpeies twn DLP is trpezes paramènoun empeirikì er¸thma. Gia na apant ume to
er¸thma autì, qrh	mopoioÔme èna deÐgma Eurwpaðk¸n trapez¸n gia thn perÐodo 2002 2007. H anlu£
mas anadeiknÔei mia atiik kai oikonomik mantik  meÐw tou kìous kefalaÐou twn trapez¸n
met thn uiojèth twn DLP. Ta apotelèata aut eÐnai ×mfwna me th jewrÐa pou proteÐnei ìti h
auxhmènh paroq  plhrofori¸n kai h auxhmènh gkri	mìthta twn oikonomik¸n katawn mporoÔn
na èqoun mantik oikonomik wfèlh gia tis uiojetoÔs epiqeir is. Epiplèon, den brÐoume meÐ-
w twn oikonomik¸n wfel¸n gia tis trpezes me auxhmènh qr  eÔlogwn axi¸n ws apotèlea ths
uiojèths twn DLP. Ta teleutaÐa aut eur mata den upohrÐzoun tis anhqÐes twn akadhmaðk¸n kai
twn trapezik¸n eleq¸n ìti h qr  ths eÔloghs logiik s axÐas mporeÐ na èqei arnhtikès epipt¸is
gia tis trpezes. EpÐs, h meÐw tou kìous kefalaÐou eÐnai pio èntonh gia tis trpezes me qamh-
l  poiìthta plhroforiakoÔ peribllontos. 'On afor thn trapezik  reuìthta, ta apotelèata
exart¸ntai apì th mèjodo potikopoÐhs ths reuìthtas.
Sto deÔtero keflaio exetzoume tis epipt¸is ths upoqrewtik s uiojèths twn DLPhn èkje twn
Eurwpaðk¸n trapez¸n  difores morfès rÐou. Qrh	mopoioÔme èna deÐgma Eurwpaðk¸n trapez¸n
gia thn perÐodo 1999 2010 kai metrme tis akìloujes trapezikès ekjèis: èkje hn agor, èkje
is allagès epitokÐwn, èkje is allagès nallagmatik¸n itimi¸n, kai èkje is allagès
tim¸n is pr¸tes Ôles. Ta apotelèat mas anadeiknÔoun aÔxh tou trapezikoÔ kindÔnou met
thn upoqrewtik  uiojèth twn DLP to 2005. Ta eur mata aut eÐnai ×mfwna me th jewrÐa ìti h
auxhmènh paroq  plhrofori¸n etik me tis prxeis antijmis kindÔnou kai h auxhmènh qr 
ths eÔloghs logiik s axÐas mporoÔn na odhg un  aÔxh ths èkjes twn trapez¸n  difores
morfès rÐwn. EpÐs, parèqoume perioriènes endeÐxeis ìti h aÔxh o rÐo twn trapez¸n eÐnai
pio èntonh gia tis trpezes pou leitourgoÔn  q¸res ìpou oi logiikoÐ arijmoÐ eÐnai pio pijanìn na
qrh	mopoihjoÔn  mbìlaia.
To trÐto keflaio exetzei th è metaxÔ twn nolik¸n etairik¸n kerd¸n kai ths apìdos twn
etairik¸n omolìgwn. Ta nolik etairik kèrdh parou	zoun ereunhtikì endiafèron epeid  parèqoun
diaforetikì eÐdos plhroforÐas ous ependutès  è me ta atomik etairik kèrdh. Ta atomik
etairik kèrdh parèqoun prwtÐws plhroforÐes etik me tis tameiakès roès twn etairi¸n en¸ ta
nolik kèrdh parèqoun kurÐws plhroforÐes gia to kìos kefalaÐou. Epliplèon, h è metaxÔ
twn nolik¸n kerd¸n kai ths agors twn etairik¸n omolìgwn eÐnai endiafèrou gia tous kal di-
aforopoihmènous ependutès pou ependÔoun  deÐktes. Qrh	mopoi¸ èna deÐgma trimhniaÐwn parathr -
wn gia thn perÐodo 1973 2010 kai brÐw ìti ta nolik kèrdh etÐzontai arhntik me tis timès twn
omolìgwn qamhloÔ rÐou kai den etÐzontai me tis timès twn omolìgwn uyhloÔ rÐou. Ta eur mat
mou anadeiknÔoun ìti oi allagès o kìos kefalaÐou epikratoÔn twn allag¸n is tameiakès roès
gia ta omìloga qamhloÔ kindÔnou, all oi allagès is tameiakès roès epikratoÔn twn allag¸n o
kìos kefalaÐou gia ta etairik omìloga uyhloÔ kindÔnou. H meÐw is timès twn omolìgwn eÐnai
megalÔterh gia ta makroprìjea kai gia ta qamhloÔ kindÔnou omìloga. Ws ek toÔtou, h euai
h-
Óa twn etairik¸n omolìgwn is allagès twn tameik¸n ro¸n kai is allagès tou kìous kefalaÐou
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exarttai apì thn hmeromhnÐa apoplhrwm s twn omolìgwn kai apì to rÐo apoplhrwm s. BrÐw ìti h
è metaxÔ twn nolik¸n etairik¸n kerd¸n kai ths agors twn etairik¸n omolìgwn exarttai apì to
plhroforiakì perieqìmeno tou nìlou twn tameiak¸n ro¸n. H uprqou bibliografÐa katadeiknÔei
ìti h arnhtik  è metaxÔ twn tim¸n twn metoq¸n kai twn nolik¸n kerd¸n wfeÐletai o plhro-
foriakì perieqìmeno tou nìlou twn dedouleumènwn. Ta teleutaÐa aut eur mata parèqoun endeÐxeis
diaforetik s diatÐmhs plhrofori¸n gia thn agor twn etairik¸n omolìgwn  è me th agor twn
metoq¸n.
Ta apotelèata twn kefalaÐwn 1 kai 2 deÐqnoun ìti oi allagès a logiik prìtupa èqoun man-
tikès oikonomikèsnèpeies gia tis uiojetoÔs epiqeir is. Ta eur mat moumbllounhz th
etik me th ×gkli twn diejn¸n logiik¸n protÔpwn. To keflaio 3 anadeiknÔei th diafor o
plhroforikì perieqìmeno twn nolik¸n ènanti twn atomik¸n logiik¸n kerd¸n kai apoteleÐ apìdeixh
ths maÓas twn gkentrwtik¸n kerd¸n gia tous ependutès.
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This dissertation contributes to the stream of literature that examines the role of
accounting information in capital markets. The first two chapters deal with the economic
consequences of changes in accounting regulations. The third chapter examines the
relation between accounting earnings and asset prices. Chapter 1 studies the impact of
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption on the cost of equity and
liquidity of European banks. The adoption of IFRS is associated with lower cost of equity
particularly for banks with low pre-adoption quality of information environment. Chapter
2 examines the effect of IFRS adoption on the risk exposure of banks in Europe. Our
analysis shows an increase in the risk exposure of banks after the mandatory adoption of
the new accounting standards. We provide limited evidence that the increase in risk
exposure is more pronounced for banks that operate in countries where accounting
numbers are more likely to be used for contracting purposes. Chapter 3 focuses on the
relation between aggregate earnings changes and corporate bond market returns.
Aggregate earnings changes are negatively related to investment-grade corporate bond
market returns and unrelated to high-yield corporate bond market returns. Further, the
earnings-returns relation is lower for high-rated and long-term corporate bonds. These
findings suggest that aggregate earnings contain information about cash flows and
discount rates. Overall, the essays in this thesis highlight the importance of changes in
accounting regulations and the significance of accounting information for equity and debt
investors.
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